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EDUCATION, SOCIAL CLASS, AND INTERGROUP ATTITUDES IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND GERMANY.

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THE CENTRAL FOCUS OF THIS REPORT IS ON THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG SOCIAL CLASS, EDUCATION, AND INTERGROUP ATTITUDES. A SECOND MAJOR FOCUS OF THIS RESEARCH CONCERNS THE FACTORS THAT SHAPE ENGLISH, FRENCH, AND GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD "OUTSIDERS." SPECIFICALLY, THE STUDY INVESTIGATED (1) THE EXTENT AND TYPE OF IMPACT THAT THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS OF THESE COUNTRIES HAVE HAD UPON THE BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES OF THEIR PEOPLE, (2) THE DIFFERENCE IN THESE AREAS BETWEEN YOUTH AND ADULTS, AND (3) THE WAYS IN WHICH THE BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES OF YOUTH RESEMBLE THOSE OF ADULTS. THESE RELATIONSHIPS ARE EXPLORED BY THE ANALYSIS OF DATA SECURED FROM INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED WITH NATIONAL SAMPLES OF THE POPULATIONS OF ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND GERMANY IN LATE 1960 AND EARLY 1961. THIS REPORT REPRESENTS AN INTERIM STAGE IN A LARGER PROJECT. (LP)

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Cooperative Research Project No. 1928

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Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey

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PREFACE

The central focus of this report is on the interrelationships among social class, education and inter-group attitudes. We explore these relationships by analyzing data secured from interviews conducted with national samples of the populations of England, France and Germany in late 1960 and early 1961.

Since this report represents an interim stage in a larger project, the preceding stages and future prospects should be made clear. In 1960 I was invited by the Social Science Division of UNESCO to design and conduct a study of intergroup attitudes among youth and adults of England, France and Germany, with general reference to the phenomenon of ethnocentrism, and with special reference to the attitudes of these populations toward Jews. After a protracted period of research design, questionnaire construction, interviewer training and pilot testing, we drew probability samples, stratified by age, from the populations of the three countries, and these samples were then interviewed.

The questionnaires were then processed and data was recorded on IBM cards. A partial analysis was made of some of the data for the German population. On the basis of this analysis, a preliminary report was made in October 1962 to an international advisory committee who had been appointed by UNESCO. With advice from that committee, a design for the further analysis of the data was constructed. An application was made to the Office of Education of the U.S. Government for a grant sufficient to advance the analysis of the data part way until further funds from UNESCO should become available. That grant was made, covering a period from December 15, 1962 to September 14, 1963. The grant specifically made possible the analysis of first order relationships among certain variables relating to social class, educational orientation and intergroup attitudes.

New financing from UNESCO will make possible the completion of the analysis, including second order relationships, not only for the variables just stated but for others as well. This report should, therefore, be seen as a report of research in progress. The fuller implications of the materials reported here will emerge in the final report covering the complete analysis.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Prior to World War II, it was evident that hostility to out-groups, whether ethnic, racial, religious or national, was a dominant characteristic of the attitudes of the populations of such European countries as England, France and Germany. While this hostility or ethnocentrism was perhaps no more intense in these countries than elsewhere, the presence of such attitudes in these most populous, most developed, and most powerful nations was clearly portentous.

Many persons entertain the hope that post-war youth in these and other countries have been raised so that they are not as marked by ethnocentrism as their elders. But little is known about the attitudes of European youth. We do not, in fact, know whether the youth have been taught differently than were their adults in the school systems of Europe. We do not know whether the adults have tended to pass on their own attitudes, relatively unchanged, to their children, or whether, in view of the events of their lives, they have sought to instill more friendly attitudes toward, and a greater ability to live with, people who are different in culture, race, religion or nationality.

The problem this research sets for itself is to explore the ranges and qualities of the attitudes of youth and adults in England, France and Germany toward people who differ from them in one or more ways. Among other things, we seek to find out what traits and characteristics (stereotypes) are assigned to various ethnic, racial and national groups and how willing or unwilling are the youth and adults to associate in various degrees of intimacy with such groups. We also explore what connections exist between the ways in which outgroups are defined and the amount of social distance from them that is desired by English, French, and German people.

A second major focus of this research concerns the factors that shape English, French and German attitudes toward "outsiders." Specifically, we investigate how much and what kind of impact have the educational systems of these countries had upon the beliefs and attitudes of their people. How do the youth differ from the adults in these regards? In what ways do they resemble the adults? In short, are the main instruments of socialization and attitude-formation -- the adults and the educational agencies -- tending toward creating a youth generation similar to or different from them in their beliefs about and feelings toward "outgroups."

Leading educators and government officials in Western European countries, including the United States, have frequently and properly expressed concern regarding the extent to which the populations of their countries, youth and adult alike, have acquired attitudes favorable to democracy and manifest an active interest and capacity to participate in democratic institutions. Special interest has been expressed in the role played by various educational agencies in shaping such attitudes and abilities to participate in democratic, culturally-diverse, societies. From the American point of view, these questions become crucial, in general because of the compatability of such institutions with our own, and in particular because we have chosen to spend large sums of money abroad, through such agencies as AID, in the belief and hope that we could thus be instrumental in furthering and strengthening democratic impulses and developments abroad.

Crucial among the requisite attitudes are those which make it possible for any group of people to live with and relate to other people who differ from them in cultural patterns, religious convictions, racial backgrounds and national origins. The capacity to sustain, coexist with and profit from cultural diversity is a central feature of a democratic people.

The general objective of this study, then, is to determine how much and what specific dimensions of this capacity for cultural diversity are present in the youth and adult populations of England, France and Germany, and what impact have the educational and other formative agencies had upon the development of this capacity.

We explore this capacity by various scales and indices, designed to give reasonably valid and reliable measurements of beliefs about and attitudes toward other groups. In England, these other groups consist of Americans, Jews, Germans and Colored. In France, the groups are the Americans, Jews, Germans and Algerians. In Germany, the groups are Americans, Jews, Poles and Russians. It can be seen that two groups are common to the three countries, namely, Americans and Jews, while the other two groups are variable.

With these measurements in hand, we will then be able to contrast the youth of each country with each other, the adults with each other, and the youth with the adults of each of the countries. This will entail a comparison of the kinds and intensities of stereotypes held about various groups; the intensity and quality of the social distance desired; the contexts in which such distance is desired more than others; the generalized orientation to outgroups, as expressed in open end questions; and the rationalizations offered for the expressed attitudes.

In an effort to understand where and how these various beliefs and attitudes have been formed, we explore in this report the following variables:

1. Education Variables, including educational level; father's educational level; educational mobility (father to son); belief in the desirability of education; intention to pursue schooling; belief in the instrumentality of education for various purposes;

belief in the relevance of school for success; belief in the importance of sacrificing oneself for the education of his children; teachers exposed to; books read and considered influential; estimates of influence of teachers vs. other sources.

2. Stratification and Mobility Variables, most particularly income, educational level, occupational level or prospects, father's occupation, occupational mobility, employment prospects, income prospects.

THE SAMPLE

While the primary concern of this investigation is with the attitudes of the youth, it is a comparative concern, that is, we want to know how and to what extent do the youth differ from their parents. It thus becomes urgent that we investigate adult attitudes as well as those of the youth. Hence the samples of the population that were chosen for study included the populations age 14 to 50 in each of the three countries. The totals on whom this report is based include 696 people in England, 708 in France and 577 in Germany.

All persons were interviewed in their homes under conditions of as much privacy as possible. The usual procedures of call backs to homes originally not available was followed in all three countries so that substitutions in the original sample list were made only after call backs proved it virtually certain that the originally designated person could not be secured.

THE INSTRUMENT

The questionnaire that was administered to the respondents was developed over a period of several months. All revisions were made by the author after scrutinizing several sets of preliminary results from the three countries. This type of central supervision made it possible to approximate fairly standard conditions of interviewing in all three countries.

One of the most serious problems naturally concerned that of comparability of questions in three different languages. This was managed, with a fair degree of success, by conferences among tri-lingual representatives of all three research organizations (DIVO in Germany, SEMA in France and the Gallup Organization in England). Serious doubts about comparability of connotation and denotation were erased for all but a few relatively minor items and, curiously, these were primarily concerned with American vs British usage of certain words such as "clannish."

Trained interviewers were used in all three countries and received approximately the same degree of field supervision and editing. Judging by reports from the various survey groups, no serious difficulties were encountered on this score in any of the countries.

While most of the questions were of the closed variety, some required open-end formulation. Samples of all such open-end responses were translated by a group of persons who were genuinely tri-lingual and, when finally translated satisfactorily into English, were content analysed and coded under the direct supervision of the author. The codes were then sent to the three survey organizations and the responses were then coded by them.

One can recognize that the final questionnaire form exhibits certain obvious deficiencies, at the same time that one may contend properly that it is a reasonably satisfactory instrument for the purposes desired.

THE MEASURE OF ASSOCIATION OF VARIABLES

The measure used for amount of association of two variables throughout this report is the "gamma" measure proposed by Goodman and Kruskal which is one of a series of measures they investigate which are based on probabilistic modes. This measure was selected in preference to the more conventional Chi square and associated measures since it permits easily understood comparison between scores derived from two cross-classifications and affords easy interpretation of any given result in terms of a predictive hypothesis.

Some properties of gamma are:

1. Gamma is 1 if the population is concentrated in an upper-left to lower-right diagonal of the cross-classification table (the case of complete association). Gamma is -1 if the population is concentrated in a lower-left to upper-right diagonal of the table (the case of complete counter-association).

2. Gamma is 0 in the case of independences, but the converse need not hold.

3. Gamma varies between -1 and 1, values above 0 indicating positive association, values below zero negative association. The closer the absolute value of gamma is to 1, the stronger is the association in question.

With regard to most of these properties, Gamma closely resembles the chi-square measure. However, the uniqueness and the value of gamma is in the predictive interpretation it allows one to put upon the result. That is, a Gamma score gives the odds that knowledge of ordering on one variable will allow you to predict ordering on a second variable. A Gamma score of +1 or -1 insures that no errors will be made in the prediction, or, in other words, knowledge of one variable completely determines ordering on another variable. Similarly, a Gamma score of 0 implies that knowledge of the ordering on one variable will be of no help in predicting knowledge of the ordering of a second variable. Similarly, if the variables are independent, or there exists no relationship between them, the Gamma score will be 0, indicating that knowledge of the ordering of either variable will be of no help in prediction of the ordering of the second variable. Gamma scores intermediate between 0 and 1 indicate the degree of certainty one has in the prediction of order.

Furthermore, confidence limits can be placed on any particular gamma result. These indicate within what degree of certainty the gamma results achieved for the sample used in the study can be expected to be valid for the whole population, say all Germans. In this study 95% confidence intervals were used throughout which indicate for each gamma score the range in which a score computed from a whole population, all English, French or Germans, will fall 95 times out of a hundred. In general, if a gamma value of 0 is contained within the lower and upper limits of the confidence intervals, the relationship is considered statistically insignificant. As a corollary, where 0 is not contained within the limits, the relationship is held to be significant. The degree or extent of significance is a function of the closeness of the mean gamma value to +1 or -1. These values are to be understood in precisely the same terms as coefficients of correlation.

THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

We are concerned with estimates of the attitudes of the populations studied toward groups who differ in ethnic, religious, or national identity. We may, therefore, speak of a measure of "generalized ethnocentrism" as one of our principal interests. But we were particularly concerned, within the framework of ethnocentrism, with the attitudes toward Jews. To develop measures of these attitudes the following questions were put to the respondents.

I give you here a card on which are listed four possible feelings you could have about other people. I am going to name some groups of people to you and ask you, in each case, to tell me how you would feel about having these people in various relationships with you. Thus, I first want to ask about neighbors. Would you be pleased, or would you say you would not mind, or would you rather not have Americans as neighbors, or would you strongly dislike the idea?

a) as a neighbor: Americans
Jews
Poles (Germans for England and France)
Russians (Colored for England, Algerians for France)

b) as a friend:
(FOR FEMALE RESPONDENTS):
as a girlfriend:

c) as a school-fellow of your children:
(STUDENTS):
as your fellow student:

d) as a fellow worker:

e) as your principal or employer:

f) as your son-in-law:

It should be noted that the respondent was asked to make judgments about each of these six relationships for each of four groups: Americans, Jews, Poles, and Russians in Germany; Americans, Jews, Germans and Colored people in England; and Americans, Jews, Germans, and Algerians in France.

Some may argue that no respondent could possibly give sensible and meaningful answers to so many questions put so quickly. It is hard to prove the case or test the case either way on this issue. But there is some internal evidence that is both striking and relevant. In the following four tables (1, 2, 3, 4) we spread some of the evidence. From these tables we can see that the percentage of rejecters varies considerably within each country for the four groups asked about -- so that there is no simple stereotyping or halo effect from one group to the next. The second relevant fact is that the similarities between the three countries are rather striking, with the differences, e.g. hostility to Jews, running in the expected direction. Third, in each country, the maximum distance expressed is found just where one would have expected it, i.e., against Russians in Germany, Algerians in France, and Colored in England.

We see in Table 4a following that in none of the three countries are Americans rejected in four to six contexts by a total of more than 8 percent of the people. The maximum rejection of Jews in four to six contexts is the 16 percent of the Germans who do so. By contrast, 42 percent of the Germans reject Russians as social associates in four to six contexts; 26 percent of the British reject the Colored at this level; and 38 percent of the French reject Algerians.

These outcomes of our inquiry give us some considerable strength of conviction that our instrument was working rather sensitively.

It should further be noted that an intensity measure is built into the questions so that different degrees of alienation could be expressed by various respondents. Though we later treated these degrees dichotomously, posing the two negative against the two positive responses (i.e., "would be pleased"and "would not mind" vs. "would rather not" and "would strongly dislike"), our instrument did make it possible at the outset for respondents of various shades of intensity of feeling to have their appropriate say.

THE INDEX OF ANTI-SEMITISM

If we focus now alone on the outcomes of the questions concerning the Jews, we find a most interesting and significant result. The following Table 5 shows that in each of the three countries, the least amount of distance, i.e. social distance or rejection of Jews, was expressed with regard to Jews as neighbors, school fellows, and fellow workers. Then, in increasing order of rejection come the relationships as friend, employer, and son-in-law. The difference between the percentages on each of these items in the three countries is by no means identical; but we cannot help but be impressed with the general similarity of the outcome. There is suggested here a kind of culture pattern, common to the three countries, such that various kinds of relationships with Jews carry a common social salience, implying a common feeling about the amount of undesired intimacy each such situation connotes.

The same pattern seems to apply, with minor exceptions, in each of the three countries, with regard to all the other "out-groups" as well. In Tables 5a, 5b and 5c, following, we have spread the detailed information about the patterns of rejection of Americans, Colored, Algerians, Russians, Germans and Poles. It is evident from these tables that relationships with out-groupers asneighbors or school fellows or fellow workers is most tolerable to the nationals of the three countries, and that they are relatively easy about having outsiders for friends as well. They save their strongest rejections for the outsider in a position of power -- namely, as employer -- and in a position of considerable intimacy and implied equality, namely, as a son-in-law. Emphasis must be put on the words "relatively easy" since, for instance, a third of the British reject Colored as neighbors, 45 percent of the French reject Algerians in that role, and 45 percent of the Germans reject Russians in that capacity. In short, they feel much more strongly about wanting to keep distance from these outsiders than from Jews, but the relative salience of the different contexts of relationship is approximately the same in all three countries, whatever the group in question.

If we now look once again at Table 5, we can see that the distribution of responses is such as to encourage one to construct an index of anti-Semitism, which would be scored as follows:

Score 1 -- those who do not reject Jews in any of of the contexts specified.

Score 2 -- those who reject Jews only as sons-in-law

Score 3 -- those who reject Jews as sons-in-law and and as employers

Score 4 -- those who reject Jews as sons-in-law, employers and friends

Score 5 -- those who reject Jews as sons-in-law, employers, friends, and in 2 or 3 out of the following three contexts: as fellow workers, fellow students, and neighbors.

The justification for combining these three social contexts in the manner just suggested derives from the fact that the percentage rejections in each of these contexts is so very close, and, therefore, one could not sensibly array them in any hierarchical order. When we score a respondent as rejecting Jews if he says that he would rather not have relationships with Jews in two or three of these three contexts, we are thereby implying that they represent relatively equal valences in the attitude structure of the respondents.

In Table C following, we see the percent for all three countries combined, and for each country individually, of the respondents who fall into each of the five categories or scores listed above.

Note that 46 percent of the British and French, and 47 percent of the Germans -- virtually identical percentages in all three countries -- reject Jews in one or more contexts. If we eliminate from our calculations those who gave no response, or whose responses were incomplete and hence unusable for calculation of the index, we find the following results (See Table 7): 55 percent of the British, 58 percent of the French and 61 percent of the Germans exhibit some degree of anti-Semitism (Categories 2,3,4,5) while for the three countries combined the figure runs to 58 percent. We can estimate conservatively then that the actual percent of those who reject Jews in one or more of four contexts runs between 46 to 55 percent of the British, 46 to 58 percent of the French, and 47 to 61 percent of the Germans. An approximate median ground would give us 50 percent for the British and French and 55 percent for the Germans. We are obviously dealing with a sentiment structure of some considerable proportion.

VALIDATION OF THE INDEX

Before we can be confident in our use of these scores, we must be sure that the Index does measure what we are concerned with, namely, hostile feelings toward Jews. To test the validity of the Index, we examined how persons who score high and low on it also score on other tests, about whose meaning we are more sure at the outset. We have four such measures, and in the following pages we shall see how our various respondents score on these. All in all, we may anticipate the findings by saying that the evidence is fairly good that the anti-Semitic index just described is a reasonably valid measure of hostility to Jews.

1. Anti-Semitism and Attitudes toward the Nazi Regime

We asked respondents to cite what they thought to be the one best feature of the Nazi regime; then, the one worst feature. We grouped all the respondents into three categories: (a) those who cited only good features of the Nazi regime; (b) those who cited both good and bad features; and (c) those who cited only good features. Expectably, the anti-Semitism scores should be highest in the first category, next in the second, and lowest in the third. Table 8 following gives the results.

We see that less than 1 percent of the English and French respondents and less than 2 percent of the German respondents cited only good features of the Nazi regime. In Table 4, we see these percents tabulated against anti-Semitism scores. Note that, except for the German data, there is little difference with regard to anti-Semitism among those who cited only bad features. However, among the German respondents, who might perhaps be expected to be more sensitive to the question, the results run in the expected direction and verge on significance: those who cited only bad features of the regime are less anti-Semitic than those who cited both good and bad or only good features. This tallies with the finding from the previous table to the effect that whereas 56 percent of the English and 47 percent of the French respondents cite only bad features of the Nazi regime, only 21 percent of the German respondents cite only bad features of the regime, with 72 percent citing both good and bad features. The relationships as measured by the gamma scores are seen in the following Table 10.

2. Anti-Semitism and Personal Feelings Toward Jews

The next test of the validity of the anti-Semitism index is done with the results of the question "How do you personally feel about Jews:" This was an open-end question and our final code summed up the results into three categories: 1. positive feelings about Jews, 2. neutral feelings, and 3. negative feelings. The coding was deliberately structured so as to minimize the amount of negative feelings that would be recorded, in order to minimize the possibility of bias.

The gamma scores on the relationship of personal feelings toward Jews with anti-Semitism (see Table 12) are comparatively high, are significant for all three countries, and run in the expected direction, those with positive feelings toward Jews exhibiting the least anti-Semitism and those with negative feelings the most.

The data yield the same kinds of results when looked at in another way, namely, in terms of the percentages in each category of personal feeling toward Jews who fall into the lowest and highest anti-Semitism categories. (Table 13 following.)

3. The Quality of Jewish Acquaintance

Respondents were queried as to the number of pleasant experiences they had had with Jews in several contexts and the responses were divided into four categories: 1) no pleasant experiences, 2) few, 3) some, or 4) many pleasant experiences. The percent distributions are seen in Table 14 following and the same scores are in Table 15 following. Note that the gamma scores for quantity of pleasant experiences vs anti-Semitism are fairly high and run in the expected direction: the greater the number of pleasant experiences, the lower the anti-Semitism score.

4. Unfavorable Stereotypes of Jews

Our next test of validity comes from a group of questions in which we asked respondents to compare Jews to other people. Each person was asked to say, with regard to each of ten traits, whether he thought Jews exhibited more, the same, or less than others of the trait. Any person could range from no unfavorable beliefs about Jews to ten such beliefs.

The results for three countries display variable degrees of association of belief in unfavorable traits of Jews and anti-Semitism. This correlation is strongest in the English data, weakest in the French results. The following two tables show the percentage distributions of the German scores. (Tables 16 and 17)

The lower French association is accounted for by the relatively high number of the French who assert many or most of the unfavorable traits concerning Jews. For example, 17 percent of the French who have the lowest anti-Semitism scores agree with all ten of the items. Altogether, 14 percent of the French respondents agree with 7 to 10 of the questions, whereas only 1.5 percent of the English and .65 percent of the Germans do so. At the other end of the scale, 78 percent of the English respondents, 55 percent of the French, and 69 percent of the Germans affirm only 1 to 3 of the unfavorable images of Jews.

Summary

On the basis of the foregoing results, we may reiterate our conviction that the index of anti-Semitism, as we have composed it here, is a reasonably valid measure of hostility or negative feelings toward Jews. The validating relationships have not been uniform in their outcomes, but the general drift of the data is such that we can be fairly safe in assuming that to the extent that these validating questions are clear-cut measures of attitudes toward Jews, the anti-Semitism index itself is also some such measure.

CHAPTER I

AGE, ANTI-SEMITISM AND GENERAL ETHNOCENTRISM

AGE AND ANTI-SEMITISM

With this confidence in the measure of anti-Semitism, we can now turn to examine the scoring patterns of the various age groups in each of the three countries, and in all three countries combined. For this is one of the main patterns in which we are interested, namely, similarities and differences among the youth and adults of the three countries.

In Table 18 following we spread the percentages in each of three main age groups in each of the three countries, and in the three countries taken together, who score in the various categories of anti- Semitism, ranging from the 1 or minimum score (reject Jews in no contexts), to the maximum score of 5 (reject Jews in all four contexts).

If we compress this table, for purposes of easy contrast, into two groups, those who reject Jews in no or one context as against those who reject them in three or four contexts, and think in terms of the former being "low" on anti-Semitism and the latter being "high" on the index, we get the following table (Table 19).

The patterning is evidently irregular. In all three countries, of course, the low anti-Semites significantly outnumber the high, sometimes, as in the case of the French youth 14 to 18, being five times as numerous. But there seems to be only a small difference between the age groups. Nor does age function as a continuous variable: notice, e.g., that the 19 to 35 age group in England has a lower proportion of "high" anti-Semitic respondents than either the 14 to 18 or the 36 to 50 groups. Similarly, the 36 to 50 group in Germany has the lowest percentage of "high" anti-Semitic respondents in that country.

In general, one would expect then that any summary measure of the relationship of age to anti-Semitism would prove weak. This is borne out by the gamma scores for age and anti-Semitism, as indicated in the following Table 20.

The gamma scores for the three countries fall between .06 and .09 but the 95 percent confidence level for each of them includes zero. However, the score for the three countries combined is .086 and, due to the greater sample size, does not include zero in the same confidence limits. This indicates that anti-Semitism, for the combined sample, is positively, though weakly, associated with increasing age. The biggest difference between the youth of each country and those over 35 occurs in the category of those who would accept Jews in every context. Whereas 48 percent of the English and French and 41 percent of the German youths are not willing to place any restrictions of the indicated type upon social intercourse with Jews, 40 percent, 37 percent and 32 percent, respectively, of their elders are so willing. The difference between the two groups is made up by the higher proportion of adults who reject Jews as sons-in-law. This may reflect the fact that only the adults have children of marriageable age. The proportion of each of the age groups falling in scale types 2, 3 and 4 is very similar.

Age alone is obviously not a very powerful variable, and more striking differences occur within each age group when other variables are controlled. These will be described, where relevant, in conjunction with our discussion of the other variables investigated in this report.

The inter-country differences are also of interest. They are never very large but they tend almost always in the same direction, namely, the greater anti-Semitism of the German population. Note, for instance, that the Germans have a somewhat smaller percentage in the group 14 to 19 who score at the low end of the anti-Semitism index -- 61 percent as against the 65 and 68 for England and France; and that the difference is even greater in the adult group, 36 and over, where 57 percent of the Germans, compared to 65 percent of the British and 66 percent of the French would reject Jews in no or at most one situation.

Similarly, when we turn to the high anti-Semites, those, that is, who reject Jews in three or four categories of relationship, we find the 14 to 18 year old Germans considerably higher than the English and French: 24 percent of the Germans vs 16 percent of the British and 12 percent of the French. In all three age groups, the Germans excel the British and French on the percent of high anti-Semites. This is perhaps the most striking finding in the entire array. It is interesting that this difference is most striking in the two younger groups, 14 to 18 and 19 to 35, and hardly at all noticeable in the over 36 group. It is as though the generations which grew up during and after World War II in Germany had somehow absorbed anti-Semitism to a greater degree than their elders who were in their young manhood or maturity during and before the war.

We shall have occasion later to examine certain other ways in which the age groups differ. For the moment, we have in front of us a rather suggestive set of data regarding a fairly weak association of age and anti-Semitism within countries, but a somewhat stronger and more striking set of differences between the same age groups in different countries.

One of the most continuously debated issues in the literature of ethnocentrism concerns the independent variability of various ethnic group antipathies. The literature is diverse in what it suggests. Some of the findings strongly support the notion that ethnocentrism is a general characteristic, such that where an individual is hostile to one out-group it is predictable he will be hostile to others. Other findings suggest, however, that it is possible for an individual to dislike one out-group, without feeling hostile to others.

We cannot hope to settle the dispute by the findings of this one study. But our findings are instructive with regard to the populations studied, and they do throw another case into the general store of evidence on this issue. Moreover, they help us gain some understanding of the nature of our respondents by indicating not only if they are generally hostile to out-groups, but how relatively hostile they are to each of several such out-groups.

Our data enable us to examine the patterns of relationship of scores on the index of anti-Semitism, on the one hand, and feelings of social distance toward such other groups as Americans, Germans (for English and French), West Indian Colored (for English alone), Polish (for Germans alone), Russian (for Germans alone), and Algerians (for French alone).

Identical questions were put to the respondent in each of the cases. Our measure of social distance for each of the groups, except the Jews, is one which expresses the number of contexts, out of a total of six, in which the respondent would prefer not to associate or have anything to do with the group in question. In the case of the Jews, we use the index scores, as described earlier. We can now look at some of the relationships.

1. Anti-Semitism and Anti-Americanism

Strikingly high gamma scores indicate a close relationship of anti-Semitism and anti-American scores. In fact, anti-Americanism appears to be the best predictor of anti-Semitism. The reverse is also true, anti-Semitism is the best indicator of anti-Americanism.

As seen in Table 21, the German scores are higher than the others, but all the results are consistent and exhibit a high correspondence between occurrence of anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism. We shall examine the results of each country in turn:

England

Sixty-nine percent of the English reject Jews in no or one context (index types 1 or 2) whereas 79 percent reject Americans in no or one relationship. One sees then that the English respondents are more willing to accept Americans than Jews in various social relationships. However, response on either of the variables is a good indication of response on the other. For example, of those who score no rejections of Jews, 90 percent score no rejections of Americans, or conversely, of those who record no rejections of Americans, 82 percent reject Jews in no or one context. On the other end of the scale, of those who reject Americans in four (of a possible six) contexts, 80 percent reject Jews in either two, three, or four contexts. However, of those who reject Jews in all social relationships, only 40 percent reject Americans in more than two contexts, and 33 percent are willing to accept Americans in all contexts. Thus, it can be said that a person scoring low on [illegible] anti-Semitism will probably also score low on anti-Americanism and vice versa, and a person scoring high on anti-Semitism is likely to score high on anti-Americanism. But a strong anti-Semite need not be a strong anti-American. Strong anti-Semitism, therefore, is a good indicator of anti-Americanism but the converse need not be true. However, the high gamma score for the test of anti-Semitism vs anti-Americanism indicates a strong predictive ordering between the two variables in general.

France and Germany

The French results display almost all the characteristics of the English results in the above respects. They are presented in Table 22.

The major difference in the German data from the French and the English data is that a German respondent who is strongly anti-American is also likely to be anti-Semitic. This accounts for the higher gamma scores among the German population than among the English and the French.

Gamma scores were also computed for 70 other variables against anti-Americanism. As indicated previously, the highest gamma score occurs with anti-Semitism, or anti-Semitism is the best predictor of anti-Americanism that we have included in the study. But the gamma scores between anti-Americanism and antipathy to other groups included in the survey are also high. The following Table 23 shows the gamma scores between anti-Americanism and anti-Polish sentiment, for the Germans, and anti-German sentiment, for the English and French.

An interesting result occurs in the German data where it is seen that none of the 429 respondents rejects Americans in more contexts than he rejects Poles. (Table 24) In this case, low anti-Polish sentiment is a good indicator of low anti-American sentiment, but the reverse is not necessarily the case. Similar statements can be made about all of this set of results.

It should be noted (Table 25) that German antipathy towards the Poles is considerably greater than either French or English antipathy towards the Germans.

Similar results occur when percentage distributions (Tables 26 and 27) and gamma tests (Table 28) are run for anti-American sentiment against another group for each country, colored for England, Algerians for France, and Russians for Germany. Gamma scores on these tests are lower than in the preceding ones because in each case considerable social distance is shown to each of the groups in question. Once again, we see that whereas low antipathy to the group in question is a good indication of low ..anti-Americanism, the reverse is by no means true.

2. England: Anti-Semitism and Anti-German and Anti-Colored Feeling

The English gamma scores (Table 29) for anti-German feeling vs anti-Semitism and anti-Colored feeling vs anti-Semitism are lower than the gamma scores for anti-Americanism vs anti-Semitism, though they are still high. The scores are lowered because of the higher rate of anti-German and anti-Colored feeling compared to anti-Jewish feeling.

From Tables 29 and 30 we deduce that if an English respondent is anti-Jewish, he is very likely to be anti-German or anti-Colored (of those who score type 5 in the anti-Semitism index, 75 percent reject Germand and 81 percent reject Colored in four to six relationships), but the reverse is not true to the same degree (of those who reject Germans in all six contexts, 22 percent accept Jews in every contest, and of those who reject Colored in every context, 31 percent will accept Jews in every one). Similarly, if a respondent is pro-German or pro-Colored (no rejections), he is very likely to be pro-Jewish (77 percent of those who score no rejections of Germans and 86 percent of those who score no rejections of Colored likewise score no rejections of Jews), and a respondent who is pro-German is likely to be pro-Jewish, but a respondent can be pro-Jewish without being pro-Colored.

3. France: Anti-Semitism and Anti-German and Anti-Algerian

The French data on antipathy to those other groups (Table 31) parallel the English data in several respects. The gamma scores (Table 32) are lower than the scores on anti-Americanism vs anti-Semitism because of the considerably higher antipathy to these groups.

Relative to anti-Semitism among the French, anti-Algerianism is very high, while anti-German feeling is about the same. Thus, the following statements can be made with confidence about the relation between anti-Algerianism and anti-Semitism.

1. If a French respondent is pro-Algerian, he is probably pro-Semitic (91 percent of those who accept Algerians in all categories accept Jews in all categories).

2. If a Frenchman is pro-Semitic, he may not be pro-Algerian (50 percent of those who accept Jews in all categories also accept Algerians in all categories).

3. If a Frenchman is extremely anti-Semitic he is almost invariable anti-Algerian (98 percent of those who fall in anti-Semitism scale type 5 reject Algerians in four to six contexts).

4. If a Frenchman is anti-Algerian, he may be pro-Semitic (41 percent of those rejecting Algerians in six contexts reject Jews in only no to one context).

On the other hand, the anti-German and anti-Semitic feelings show more of a parallel.

3. Germany: Anti-Semitism and Anti-Polish and Anti-Russian Sentiment

The German data for the relationship between anti-Polish or anti-Russian sentiment and anti-Semitism (Table 33) are very much the same and the same comments can be made of each. The gamma scores (Table 34) of both are much the same.

Similarly, the amount of rejects of Poles or Russians is about the same and high compared to the rejection of Jews.

The following statements can be made about the data:

1. If a German is pro-Russian or pro-Polish, he is likely to be pro-Semitic (92 percent of those who accept Poles in every social relationship and 90 percent of those who accept Russians in all contexts also accept Jews in all contexts).

2. If a German is pro-Semitic he may be anti-Russian or anti-Polish (of those who accept Jews in every category, 42 percent reject Poles and 45 percent reject Russians in at least one category).

3. If a German is extremely anti-Semitic he is extremely likely to be anti-Polish and anti-Russian (of those who fall in anti-Semitic scale type 4, 88 percent reject Poles and 80 percent reject Russians in four to six contexts).

4. If a German is anti-Polish or anti-Russian, he may still be pro-Semitic (39 percent of those who reject Poles in all categories, and 42 percent of those who reject Russians in all categories, reject Jews in only no to one context).

It is interesting to compare the three countries on their absolute level of antipathy to the various minority or out-groups investigated by the survey. For this purpose we have computed (Table 35) the percent of respondents in each country who reject the various groups in more than one context. Rejections in these categories indicate a basic unwillingness to share the normal experiences of social or professional life with these groups on the part of the respondents.

The striking fact about the array seen in Table 35 is the similarity of the patterns for each country. The big differences between antipathy to various groups lies within each country rather than between each country. The Americans are the most favored group in each country and are rejected in one or more social contexts by 21 percent to 29 percent of the respondents. The least favored group in each country is rejected by 54 percent to 64 percent of the respondents in each country. The spready in the percentage rejections from the most favored to least favored group in each country is quite large and far greater than the difference between the percentage rejection of the same group in different countries.

4. General Ethnocentrism

We attempted to construct a measure of ethnocentrism which would incorporate information on a respondent's attitude to the three groups investigated in his country (not including his attitude to Jews).

The measure of ethnocentrism that we used was constructed by determining the total number of rejections that a respondent makes to three groups (other than Jews). Since each group can be rejected in six possible relationships, a respondent may have an ethnocentric score ranging from 0 (no rejections) to 18 (rejecting all three groups in all contexts). We took this range of 19 points (0 to 18) and arbitrarily divided it into four segments, as follows:

Score 1:	lowest rejection	0 to 4 rejections
Score 2:	2nd lowest rejection	5 to 9 rejections
Score 3:	2nd highest rejection	10 to 14 rejections
Score 4:	highest rejection	15 to 18 rejections

It should be remembered that these scores can be gotten in numerous ways, so that no internal pattern can be calculated from the score. Thus, a score of six rejections could be secured by rejecting two groups in each of three contexts, and not rejecting the third group at all, or e.g., one could reject all three groups in two contexts, etc. This is a shortcoming in the device so contrived, but it provides us with some additional evidence about generalized ethnocentrism.

In the following table (Table 36) we see the distributions of these composite scores.

It is evident from this table that substantial percentages of the population of each country exhibit some amount of general ethnocentrism: 49 percent of the people in England, 49 percent of those in France, and 58 percent of those in Germany score more than the minimum amount. This compares very closely with the 50 percent of the English and French, and 55 percent of the Germans who score more than the minimum amount of anti-Semitism.

The consonance of these two tendencies -- general ethnocentrism on the one hand, and particularized anti-Semitism on the other -- is shown in the following table of gamma scores (Table 37).

The scores,as can be seen, are relatively very high and consistent among all three countries, indicating a close relationship of the particular and the general forms of group antipathy. These same conclusions are borne out when we recast the data in other terms, as in Table 38 following. In reading these figures, it should be recalled that the anti-Semitism index scores run from a minimum score of 1 to a maximum of 5, and the general ethnocentrism index runs from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 4.

The parallelism in the figures is evident: high anti-Semitism implies high ethnocentrism and vice versa, and low anti-Semitism implies low ethnocentrism, and vice versa.

Another way to put this relationship is to say that the amount of anti-Semitism expressed by a respondent is a rather good predictor of the amount of generalized ethnocentrism that respondent is likely to express. In future pages, then, we speak of the anti-Semitic tendencies of various types of respondents, and of the possible sources of these hostilities and antipathies to Jews, and we are also speaking, to some significant degree, of the respondents' ethnocentric tendencies and the sources of those tendencies.

AGE AND ETHNOCENTRISM

Now that we have seen how the populations as wholes feel about social relationships with various out-groups, we can examine the similarities and differences among the various age groups within and between the three countries. In Table 39, following, we show the percent of each age group in each category of ethnocentrism (from low of 1 to high of 4), for all three countries combined; in Tables 40, 41, and 42 we portray results for the three countries separately; and in Table 43 are shown the gamma scores that measure the relationships among age and ethnocentrism for the three countries, individually and combined.

Though the gamma results indicate that the relationship of age and ethnocentrism is not strong (only the three countries combined, and England separately, show significant statistical dimensions) the direction of the differences as seen in the percentage tables, is unmistakeable: in general, the older the group, the more ethnocentric. The younger groups usually have more of their members who score low on ethnocentrism and fewer of their members who score high on ethnocentrism. The relationship of age and ethnocentrism, then, is similar to that found for age and anti-Semitism, but somewhat stronger and more uniform. It will be recalled, for instance, that the oldest German group was the least anti-Semitic. In France, for instance, the group 19 to 25 is a fraction more ethnocentric than the oldest group, and among the Germans, the oldest group has the smallest percentage in both high and low ethnocentric scores. These apparent anomalies aside, the general direction of the data is clearly toward an inverse relationship of age and ethnocentrism.

If we compare age groups across country lines, we see that the Germans have substantially fewer -- 50 percent -- of their youngest group in the lowest ethnocentric category as compared with the 60 percent of the French and British; and that 7 percent of the German youth are in the highest ethnocentric score group, as compared with the 2 percent of the British and the 0 percent of the French. The differences between the 19 to 35 groups and the 36 to 50 groups in the three countries, on percentages in low ethnocentrism categories, follows the same pattern. The English are least ethnocentric, as measured by this figure, the French next, the Germans last. The only striking discordance is the 3 percent of the German group 36 to 50 who are in the highest ethnocentric group compared with the 4 percent of the French and the 6 percent of the British in this category.

We may sum up these findings by noting that the younger age groups in all three countries tend to be less ethnocentric than their elders; and that, group for group, the Germans are more ethnocentric than the French and British.

CHAPTER II

BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS

Several significant findings are now in front of us.

1. There is a fairly substantial amount of anti-Semitism in all three countries. Fifty percent or more of each of the populations express a desire to keep away from one or more relationships with Jews. Around 10 percent of each of the populations would reject Jews in all relationships about which they were asked.

2. The most intensely rejected relationships are those with Jews as employers and sons-in-law; the least intense involve Jews as fellow workers, fellow students, neighbors, and friends.

3. The German rejections of Jews run somewhat higher than the British or the French, for both the adult and youth populations.

4. In all three countries, the youth are somewhat, though not strikingly, less anti-Semitic than their elders.

5. Anti-Semitism -- or hostility to or desire for distance from Jews -- is very closely related in all three populations to hostilities to other outgroups, such as Germans and Colored in England, Algerians and Germans in France, and Poles and Russians in Germany. Though there are exceptions, and the relationships are not always symmetrical, generally the more anti-Semitic the respondent the more is he inclined also to express hostility to any other group about which he is asked. In general, too, hostility to Americans is the least strong of all the group antipathies measured, Jews are next, and then the other groups just mentioned come in for the higher amounts of antipathy.

If these are the gross patterns of rejection of Jews by the people of England, France and Germany, what is it that these populations believe about Jews that may contribute to or rationalize or explain their desire for social distance.

To probe this matter, all respondents were asked to compare Jews with other people they knew, indicating whether, in their opinion, Jews exhibited more, the same, or less of ten particular traits. In Table 44 are seen the response patterns for each of the countries. These data are based on the totals in each of the populations who answered all ten items, 374 in England, 254 in France and 297 in Germany.

One is struck immediately by the fact that in each of the countries the three negative beliefs about Jews affirmed most frequently are the same: Jews are said to be more clannish, more greedy and less honest in business than others. The English percentages on greed and dishonesty are almost identical; and the Germans feel more strongly about dishonesty than about greed. But this trinity of clannishness, greed and dishonesty is clearly the dominant negative image of the Jews.

Equally striking are the differences in the absolute figures. Nearly three-fourths of the British and French speak of Jewish clannishness, but only a half of the Germans do so. Similarly, while a little more than a fourth of the British feel negatively toward Jews regarding greed and dishonesty, nearly half of the French population feel this way. So, too, the Germans themselves vary strikingly between the 40 percent who aver that Jews are dishonest and the just more than a fourth who speak of their greediness.

The French would seem to have the most well developed and widespread negative images.

The fourth place votes also show interesting differences. The British give fourth place to the belief that Jews are less democratic than others; the French give this position to the idea that Jews are worse citizens, and the Germans to the belief that Jews are less courageous. Finally, one should note the rather sharp drop in the percentages once the top three beliefs are stated. It is as though most of the negative attitude toward Jews is used up in three major unfavorable beliefs.

The "positive" beliefs are also intriguing. Over half the British think the Jews are better parents and more intelligent than others; and a third or more of the British think that Jews are more moral and better citizens. By contrast, nearly a half of the French avow that Jews are more intelligent than others, over a third that they are more courageous, and about a fourth that they are more democratic and better parents. In Germany, by comparison, slightly more than 40 percent say Jews are more intelligent, nearly a fourth say they are better neighbors, a fifth say they are better citizens, while only 15 percent say they are better parents.

The uniformities in the "positive" beliefs are evidently not as outstanding as those in the negative beliefs. But one can say roughly that there seems to be a fairly common image of the Jew in these three countries. The Jew is seen as more clannish, more greedy and less honest in business, but also as more intelligent, a better parent, and often more moral, a better citizen and a better neighbor.

If we now ignore which of the traits is in question, and simply consider the total number of unfavorable traits ascribed to Jews by persons in each country, we get the results shown in Table 45.

Two figures stand out above all others. First is the fact that 13 percent of the French, as compared with none, or less than one percent of the British and Germans avow that Jews exceed other people in all unfavorable characteristics. The second noteworthy fact is that nearly twice as many in England, as compared to France and

Germany ascribe only one unfavorable trait to Jews. (It should be remembered that this trait is "clannishness" and that the British interviewers and survey staffs contend that to say someone is clannish in England is not at all pejorative. However, we have included the trait under those considered unfavorable on the general reasoning that while it is eminently possible to avow with positive intent that oneself and one's intimates are clannish, it seems contradictory of ordinary connotations to ascribe clannishness to others without pejorative meanings.)

It should also be noted that with the exception of the 13 percent of the French who ascribe ten unfavorable traits to Jews, only a very small number consider Jews worse than others on six or more traits. In short, it seems as though the unfavorable traits most frequently attributed to Jews exhaust virtually all that is believed as unfavorable of Jews -- at least so far as the ten traits presented to the respondents are concerned.

The relationship between these beliefs and general anti-Semitism, as measured by our index, reveals some very interesting results, as shown in Table 46 where we spread the percentage distributions, and Table 47 where we show the gamma values for the relationships.

Here now we see strong relationships. In each country, those who are more anti-Semitic are under-represented among those who ascribe only one unfavorable trait to Jews, but are over-represented among those who ascribe six or more unfavorable traits to Jews. In short, there seems to be good inter-predictability between the number of unfavorable traits ascribed and the degree of anti-Semitism. The gamma values bear this out strongly. The values are all relatively high, all indicate a positive correlation between stereotyping of Jews and anti-Semitism in general, and all are statistically significant. The curious fact of the 13 percent French who ascribe all ten negative traits to Jews also shows up in the gamma values, for we see that as compared with the German and English gammas, the French is significantly lower.

The strength of the relationships just measured lies principally, as we see from Table 46 , in the contrasts at the extremes. That is, the sharp differences in scoring patterns between high and low anti-Semites is focussed mainly at the one end of the continuum where but one trait is involved, and at the other end, where 6 to 10 traits are involved. In the middle ranges, however, where 2 to 5 traits are involved, anti-Semitism and stereotyping are not as obviously inter-predictive. For as we note from Table 46 when we deal with those who ascribe 2 or 3 unfavorable traits to Jews, we find that the percentages among the high and low anti-Semites approach equality much more closely than when we deal with the extremes. In short, the linear correlation of anti-Semitism and unfavorable stereotyping of Jews is clear and unmistakeable among those holding the most favorable and the least favorable images of what Jews are like as compared with others, but is not nearly so clear and straightforward among those who hold a mixed view of what Jews are like, seeing them as worse than others in some but not in all regards. One might think of this mixed view of Jews as an expression of an ambivalent attitude, and of the scores on the anti-Semitism index as reflecting an ambivalent desire for some distance, but not total distance. Alternatively, one might wish to think of these scores as reflecting partial hostility, or antipathies confined to specific areas, and not generalized to all possible contacts.

However we conceptualize these scoring patterns, the linearity of the relationship at the extremes, and the mixed results in the middle ranges of scores, indicate that what people believe to be true about Jews is an important ingredient in their total set, as that set is expressed in their desires to keep social distance from Jews. We cannot say, however, whether they desire to keep distance from Jews because they have these adverse beliefs about them, or whether they have these beliefs because they have kept their distance from them, or whether they have these beliefs and desire to keep distance for still other, as yet undisclosed, reasons.

Beliefs in Hereditary Sources of Behavior

Now it is important to ask whether the traits attributed to Jews are believed to be acquired characteristics, environmentally induced, or whether these attributes are seen as something "racial" or "genetic" or "hereditary". The importance of this issue lies in the fact that if traits are considered genetic or inborn, they are, to that degree, likely to be considered irremovable and permanent, while if they are seen as acquired or learned, they are to that degree capable of being altered or removed by manipulation of the relevant environmental forces.

Because it was our conviction that belief in hereditary attributes is one of the main ingredients of intergroup antipathy, we explored this matter at considerable length. We repeat now the rather lengthy instructions that were given to each respondent before he was asked to classify a series of traits as completely or mainly hereditary, or completely or mainly environmental, or half and half.

"People are different. Certain people are tall, others short. Some have light skin, others have dark skin. Some are shy and withdrawn, others are outgoing and self-confident.

HOW CAN WE EXPLAIN THESE DIFFERENCES?

In fact there are three possible ways in which these characteristics can be explained.

1. Either these similarities and differences between people are due to heredity, that is, men are born with these characteristics, they have them at birth, they inherit them, biologically, from their parents and ancestors. Such traits are called hereditary.

2. Or these similarities and characteristics are acquired after birth, at some time or other during the life time of the individual. The individual is influenced

by other people, such as his parents, or teachers or friends, or, in the case of other kinds of traits, he may acquire them because of the climate in which he lives, or the kind of food he eats. Anything that is acquired this way, after birth, due to the influence of the environment, including natural forces and people, we call environmental.

3. Or, these traits and characteristics are due to both heredity and environment; that is, the individual has them to some degree at birth, but they are also influenced by factors after birth, by people or by nature.

HERE IS A CARD. AS YOU CAN SEE, THIS CARD CONTAINS FIVE POSSIBILITIES (READ):

1. Completely hereditary, i.e., present at birth, inherited, inborn.

2. Mainly hereditary, partly environmental, i.e. mainly inborn and inherited, but partly acquired after birth as well.

3. Half and half, i.e., about half hereditary and inborn, about half acquired and environmental.

4. Mainly environmental, partly inborn, i.e., mainly acquired after birth, but partly inherited.

5. Completely environmental, not at all inborn, i.e., completely acquired after birth, and not at all due to heredity.

Now, I am going to read you a list of characteristics or traits, and I am going to ask you your judgment as to how you would explain a given trait. Take eye color for example. If you think that a person's eye color is completely hereditary, i.e. completely inborn, inherited, then you would answer that way, according to the card you have, namely category No. 1, completely hereditary. But if you think eye color is due mainly to birth, but also partly to later environmental influences, then you would answer that way, category No. 2, mainly hereditary, on your card. Please do that with each of the characteristics I am going to mention. First, how would you explain that a person is tall or short. Would you say it was (1) completely hereditary; (2) mainly hereditary; (3) about half hereditary and half environmental; (4) mainly environmental; or (5) completely environmental? (RECORD RESPONDENT'S ANSWERS IN THE CORRESPONDING COLUMNS).

ON WHAT DOES IT DEPEND THAT A PERSON:	1 completely hereditary	2 mainly hereditary, part environment	3 half-heredity, half environment	4 mainly environment, part heredity	5 completely environment
1. is tall or small					
2. is brave or cowardly					
3. is clever or stupid					
4. is honest or dishonest					
5. has a dark or a light skin					
6. is loyal or disloyal to his country					
7. is industrious or lazy					
8. raises his children strictly or leniently					
9. is aggressive or shy					
10. cares a great deal about making money or does not care about money					

It will be seen from our list of ten traits that some refer strictly to physical facts, such as height and skin color, while others refer to values and ideologies, and still others refer to character or personality orientations. From the known facts of human biology, only three of the ten traits could correctly be considered as much as 50 percent hereditary, namely, height, skin color and intelligence. With the possible additional exception of some genetic basis for aggressiveness vs shyness, all the other traits should be marked as completely environmental.

Our concern, however, is not with the correctness of the answers but rather with the extent to which they indicate that the respondents believe in hereditary determination of traits and attributes that are scientifically known not to be hereditary but rather environmental, i.e., learned, rather than inborn.

In Table 48 we have spread the figures showing what percent of each of the three populations believes that each of the ten traits is completely, mainly, or at least half hereditary.

The figures tell a most revealing story about the ways in which the populations of these three countries view human personality, character and behavior. The smallest percentage figure on the table is the 26.9 percent of the French who believe that whether a man is loyal or disloyal is totally or mainly a matter of heredity. Nearly 30 percent of the Germans and over 40 percent of the British feel the same way. Over 50 percent of each population feels that bravery and cowardliness also are hereditary in source. About the same percentages view the trait of industriousness and laziness in the same way. And over 40 percent of each population says that whether a man cares about money a good deal or does not so care depends totally or mainly on his biological inheritance from his parents!! Here, then, are three sets of people who exhibit a very strong inclination to interpret and understand human behavior in terms of inborn and genetic traits as much if not more than in terms of learning and environment.

These findings lead naturally to the question as to whether those who believe in the hereditary origins of behavior are also those who are more anti-Semitic, and whether the negative traits ascribed to Jews are believed to be hereditary in origin and hence viewed as permanent factors in the situation leading to the maintenance of social distance from Jews.

We see in Tables 49 and 50 the percentages of the people in each of the three countries who believe in the hereditary character of various numbers of traits, disregarding now the particular quality of the trait. The full distributions are in Table 49 and a condensation of that table is found in Table 50 The fact that the Germans have the lowest number believing in the hereditary character of only 1 to 3 traits and the highest in the 8 to 10 trait bracket is consonant with previous findings regarding the Germans' higher disdain of Jews. Aside from those differences, none of the other differences are outstanding.

What is of great significance for us, however, is the fact that in each country 85 percent or more of the people believe in the hereditary character of more than the maximum of three traits that one could scientifically assign to hereditary bases. That is to say, things that are scientifically known to be learned orientations, values or character traits, learned, that is, rather than biologically inherited, are nevertheless held by these populations to be inherited. One-fourth to one-third of each of the populations, indeed, believes that 8 to 10 traits are hereditary in origin. This is very convincing evidence that in all three populations there is an important tendency to view human similarities and differences in values and behavior, as well as in physical appearance, as being inborn and hence much more permanent or inalterable than if they were believed due to circumstances and environment. At least some of the traits ascribed to Jews -- as we saw in Tables 49 and 50 must be among those believed to be hereditary and permanent, passed on through biological inheritance, from generation to generation.

But now we must reckon with the possibility that these beliefs about hereditary negative characteristics of Jews do not get translated into action in the form of desires for social distance, point for point. To examine this possibility we lay the facts about hereditary beliefs alongside certain anti-Semitism index scores to see whether those who are least anti-Semitic are also those who believe in heredtiary traits, and whether, correspondingly, those who are most anti-Semitic believe most in heredity.

In Table 51 we spread certain percentages, indicating, for instance, the percent of those who score in anti-Semitism category 1 (lowest anti-Semitism) who believe in the hereditary basis of 1 to 3 traits, as against the percent who score in anti-Semitism category 5 who have the same minimal hereditarian orientaticn. We see from Table 51 that in each of the three countries the outcome is as one would expect. Significantly fewer percent of the high anti-Semites believe in one hereditary basis of only 1 to 3 traits.

The picture changes, however, as we examine the middle range and the other extreme. In the middle range, aside from the German group, there is virtual identity of both low and high anti-Semitism scores among those who believe in the hereditary character of 4 to 7 traits. In the German population, the high anti-Semites have significantly fewer persons than the low anti-Semites in this middle group, a fact susceptible of two very different interpretations.

At the extreme -- we see that in both the French and German populations, the data are as we would expect

-- the percent of those who score low on anti-Semitism who believe in the hereditary basis of 8 to 10 traits is significantly smaller than the percent of those who score high on anti-Semitism. The results among the British are in the same direction but by no means as decisively different.

Testing for the actual correlation among beliefs in hereditary traits and anti-Semitism, we compute gamma scores which we show in Table 52.

Once again, the results are as expected. The gamma values for all three countries combined, and for France and Germany separately, reveal significant relationships between anti-Semitism and hereditarian beliefs: the more the person believes in the hereditary basis of human behavior, the more anti-Semitic does he appear to be, or vice versa. The English results, however, are indecisive -- the gamma limits include zero and hence the relationship may be said to be insignificant. That is, in England as contrasted with France and Germany, it would not be safe to claim that if one knew how an individual felt about heredity vs environment one would have some predictive knowledge about how he felt about Jews. In France and Germany, by contrast, one would have a greater confidence in some such predictive knowledge -- our figures say.

May we conclude, therefore, that there is a relationship among these variables; that it appears as though the traits attributed to Jews are believed often to be of hereditary origin; that the more of such unfavorable attributes one ascribes to Jews the higher is his score on anti-Semitism likely to be; further, many of the traits are apparently seen as hereditary in origin; and finally, aside from the British population, the more one believes in such hereditary sources of behavior, the higher is one's score on anti-Semitism.

BELIEFS IN RACIAL QUALITIES

The results of the previous inquiry into hereditarian beliefs have been suggestive but surely not decisive. We know that significant portions of the populations believe in hereditary sources of character and behavior; we know also that significant percentages of the three countries hold some form of negative image of the Jewish people; we also know that 50 percent or more of the three samples studied want to keep social distance from the Jew in one or another social context. Our data also suggest there are inter-relationships here, such that the more a person believes in hereditary sources of behavior, the more is he also likely to view the Jews negatively and to desire social distance from him. But it must be reiterated that these are tendencies in some portions of the populations and by no means dominant characteristics of the majorities.

Now, in quest for some additional evidence regarding the bearing of hereditary thinking on attitudes toward Jews, we inquired whether the people of these three countries think in terms of "race" and "racial qualities". For example, do they think that the attributes of people, such as the greatness of weakness of a nation, are due to racial, i.e. inherited factors, or do they think such group attributes are due to learning and environment? In short, we investigate the degree of "hereditary" type of thinking again but this time in somewhat different ways and terms.

To discover the degree of "racist" orientation among these populations, we posed the following questions:

"May I read some statements to you. They express opinions that some people agree with and others do not. Please tell me whether you, yourself, tend more to agree with these opinions or whether you tend more to disagree with these opinions.

	More agree with it	More disagree with it	Partly	No opinion (Only in case respondent insists)
1. Every nation has racial characteristics which make its people, by nature, different from those of other nations.				
2. Some nations are by nature warlike, while others are by nature peaceful.				
3. All races of the world have about the same percentages of stupid and clever people in their midst				
4. People's behavior depends mostly on what they have learned and experienced and little, or not at all, on their racial inheritance.				
5. People of all different races can get on perfectly well together.				
6. No matter how much we try to give the same chances to people, members of some races will just naturally succeed more than members of other races.				

7. The great civilizations of the world have been made by the great races of the world.

8. Certain races are by nature immoral as compared with other races.

9. In the end, no matter what one's education or training, race and blood will tell.

10. The racial characteristics of a country are crucial in determining whether it will be powerful or weak.

In Table 53 are shown the number and percent of persons in each of the three countries who gave "racist" responses to the items just listed. A racist response is defined by agreement with items 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, and disagreement with items 3, 4, 5.

The results shown in this table, in general, support our claim that substantial portions of all three populations think in "hereditary" terms. Note, for instance, that in all three countries, over 50 percent of the people affirm a "racist" position on at least five of the ten questions; and that the percentages of racist responses are in the 30's and 40's on two or three of the remaining five items. Only on item 5 do large majorities of the people take a stand that favors a learning and environmental theory of behavior over a biologistic racist theory. In items 3 and 4, it should be noted, the respondents do not deny the racial basis of behavior, but rather that all races have about the same percentages of clever and stupid people and that people from all races can get on together.

We cannot be sure, of course, that in accepting the term "race" the respondents really meant to imply that biological inheritance shapes and determines behavior and attitudes. But it is strongly suggested that, in fact, they do take that stand. Notice, for instance, that over three-fourths of the people in each of the countries say that it is true that every nation has racial characteristics that make its people different by nature from other nations; that comparable percentages affirm the "by nature" warlike character of some races; and that nearly 50 percent of the people in England and Germany and 68 percent of those in France say that certain races are by nature immoral.

But notice, too, by way of sharp contrast, and by way of revealing great inconsistency in the attitudes and thought processes of these people, that three-fourths of the population, or more, in each country agree with the statement that "people's behavior depends mostly on what they have learned and experienced, and little or not at all on their racial inheritance."

In view of this radical inconsistency, one would ordinarily be inclined not to give much credence to the responses to any of the items. But because the respondents had six or seven clear cut chances to deny the validity of racial determinants of behavior, and chose to deny these determinants unequivocally only once, and in further view of the evidence of the same hereditarian-thought proclivities as documented in the previous section, we favor giving some weight to the responses to these items on racial factors.

Equally interesting is the inter-country variability on these responses. The three countries tend to resemble each other very strongly on some items and differ very strongly on yet others. On items 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 there is a relative uniformity in the scoring patterns, while on items 5, 8, 9, and 10 there are some marked differences. Note, for instance, that three times as many people in Britain as in France or Germany agree that people of all different races can get on perfectly well together. Or, consider the fact that over two-thirds of the French, as compared with less than 50 percent of the British or Germans, insist that certain races are immoral by nature as compared with other races. See, also, how, in response to item 9, just one-fifth of the French, nearly half the British, and over two-thirds of the Germans agree with the statement that "In the end, no matter what one's education or training, race and blood will tell." Finally, we see the substantial inter-country differences in response to item 10, which avows the importance of the racial characteristics of a country in determining whether the country will be powerful or weak.

No single pattern is perceivable in these differences. No one country clearly dominates the others in the degree to which its people take a racist view of matters. Each country also shows internal inconsistency, by affirming the importance of race on some matters and denying it on another. One probably has to say, therefore, that while, in general, the populations of these three nations tend more than not to favor a racial view of behavior and character, each shows internal variability in its intensity of conviction on this matter, from aspect to aspect, and they show considerable difference among themselves in the patterns of their responses.

Now we may put aside the question of the specific items and contrive a gross measure of predilection to racist thought for each nation. In Table 54 we show the number and percentage in each country who give one to ten racist answers on these ten items, and in Table 55 we give a condensed version of Table 54. The evidence from the condensed set of figures is not very striking, at least as far as inter-country differences are concerned. To be sure, the English and Germans have nearly twice as many persons giving eight to ten racist replies, and the English have a smaller percent than either of the other countries who give the minimum of one to three racist responses. But these are all at absolutely lower figures, and, otherwise, in general, the patterns look pretty much alike. Moreover, if we compare these gross patterns with those recorded for "hereditary thinking" we see, as is shown in the table, that the countries pretty strongly resemble each other in both instances.

Now we may ask whether the relationships shown between hereditary thinking and anti-Semitism will be supported by comparable outcomes in the relationship of racist thinking and anti-Semitism.

In Table 56 we repeat the gamma values for the relationship between hereditarian beliefs and anti-Semitism, and lay these next to the gamma values for the relationship between racist beliefs and anti-Semitism.

On both gamma measures, it is evident, the English relationships are weaker than those for the French and Germans. But each country shows a stronger relationship between racist beliefs and anti-Semitism than between the latter and hereditarian beliefs. In short, the modest relationship that was earlier perceived has now been supported by an even stronger evidence that persons who tend more to ascribe biological or hereditary or racial origins and sources to behavior also tend more to be hostile to Jews.

Because of the high relationship previously shown between hostility to Jews in particular and general ethnocentrism, or hostility to out groups in general, one should expect to find that racist thinking should also show determinate relationships with general ethnocentrism. The table of gamma values (Table 57) confirms this suspicion. It also shows that the relationship of racist thinking and ethnocentrism is stronger than that between hereditarian beliefs and ethnocentrism. This is the same order of difference as was just found with regard to the relationships of these sets of beliefs and anti-Semitism.

We might also expect that the same kinds of relationships will be found between the modes of thought and the tendency to impute negative characteristics to Jews. As we see from the gamma table 58 our expectations are met. For, while the gamma values for hereditary thinking and negative Jewish stereotypes are not clear cut, those for racist thinking and such stereotypes are determinate and in the expected direction.

Finally, because of the strong negative relationship of level of education and anti-Semitism, we should expect some such relationship between level of education, on the one hand, and hereditary and racist thinking on the other. In the gamma table 59 these expectations are again borne out. Both types of belief-systems relate negatively to level of education, and the mean gamma values for the relationship between education and racist thinking are stronger in France and Germany and slightly weaker in England.

In view of these findings, one may say with some confidence that there is a definite relationship between modes of thought about human character and behavior, on the one hand, and anti-Semitic attitudes on the other, such that the more a person tends to believe that the character or behavior of individuals or groups is due to inborn, or genetic, or hereditarian, or racial factors, the more likely is he to be both particularly anti-Semitic and generally ethnocentric.

In sum, those respondents studied here who exhibit anti-Semitic attitudes tend more than others to think of Jews, and of other out groups to whom they feel hostility, as groups who have negative or undesirable characteristics that are inborn or "racial" in origin, and these ideas about Jews and others tend to underlie their hostility toward them as expressed in their desire to keep distance from them.

May one infer, therefore, that serious attention needs to be paid to the general ways in which these populations think about others, particularly the ways in which they believe an individual or a people become what they are and behave the way they do. For our data and other data suggest that if there are negative images of a people, and if these images are based on convictions that the disdained group is "that way by nature", then the negative characteristics are likely to be considered irremediable and the hostility, in turn, is likely to be more enduring than it would be if the demeaned characteristics were considered due to environment and situation, and hence subject to alteration and change. This is, of course, to ignore completely the question of whether what is said to be true of the Jews and other out groups by these people has any basis in fact, and only to focus on the quality of the beliefs themselves and the degree to which they may be subject to effective change.

CHAPTER III

STRATIFICATION AND ANTI-SEMITISM

STRATIFICATION AND ANTI-SEMITISM

In this section we shall examine the differentiating effects of the following variables:

1. manual vs non-manual labor occupations
2. occupational level, more finely distinguished, e.g., professionals, managers, etc.
3. father's occupation
4. father's school level
5. occupational mobility, i.e., changes from father to son
6. income
7. educational mobility, i.e., changes from father to son in level of schooling achieved.

These may all be seen as constituting indices of social and economic position, or of places in the stratification order, as that term is generally used. We exclude the educational level of the respondent, reserving that for analysis in the next chapter when we consider a series of attitudes toward education for their possible bearing on attitudes toward Jews.

We may summarize the findings we are about to present by noting that:

1. Educational mobility proved to be of virtually no significance in any of the three countries, i.e., none of the gamma scores which measure the relationship of educational mobility and scores on the anti-Semitism index are statistically significant nor do they even approach such significance in any noteworthy way.

2. Father's occupation, respondent's occupational mobility, and income were significantly related to scores on anti-Semitism only in the English sample.

3. Father's school level, occupation, and manual vs. non-manual labor proved to be significant differentiators in at least two of the three countries.

We can now examine each of these factors briefly.

1. Father's School Level

The table of gamma values, Table 60 , indicates the strength of relationship among father's level of school achievement and respondent's attitudes toward Jews. It can be seen that only the English and the Combined (all three countries taken together) scores are significant at the 95 percent level (i.e. the range of the limits does not include 0). But the general results for all three countries are clearly in the direction of an inverse relationship between level of education and anti-Semitism, i.e., the higher the education, the lower the level of anti-Semitism. This is true even though the actual range of education is rather small, what with 75 percent or more of the respondents' fathers in each of the countries not having gone beyond primary school.

2. Occupation

This variable refers only to respondents in non-farm occupations and is divided into five categories: 1. academic, professional, or big businessman; 2. small businessman or white collar; 3. foreman or skilled worker; 4. semi-skilled or unskilled worker; 5. unemployed or housewife. The ordering of these categories is arbitrary, but follows several census procedures and constitutes a rough approximation at an occupational prestige ladder.

It will be seen from the table of gamma values (Table 61) that, except for the German data, the results indicate that that order is relevant to the level of anti-Semitism: anti-Semitism increases from category 1 to category 5. The percentages from each category in the various anti-Semitism scale levels help the situation. (Table 62).

In each country, those in occupational category 1 (professionals, big businessmen, academicians) have the lowest level of anti-Semitism, although the percent in the lowest anti-Semitism categories vary from 94 percent in

England to 71 percent in Germany. At the other end of the occupational ladder, housewives have among the highest anti-Semitism levels in Germany and among the lowest in England. Semi-skilled and unskilled respondents in England are relatively more anti-Semitic than those in France or Germany. White collar workers in all three countries score at relatively low levels of anti-Semitism, though in France and Germany there is little difference between them and all other categories except professionals.

3. Manual vs. Non-Manual

The results of this contrast between manual and non-manual workers (which excludes housewives) helps to firm what we have just found and demonstrate a substantially higher rate of anti-Semitism among the manual, as opposed to the non-manual workers. (Table 63).

The percentages of manual and non-manual workers in the high and low anti-Semitism categories is significant. (Table 64)

The least anti-Semitic group are the non-manual French respondents, who constitute only 25 percent of the French working force. The English non-manual respondents also exhibit a comparatively low level of anti-Semitism and make up 45 percent of the English working population. The spread in each country between non-manual and manual workers is about the same, though the German manual and non-manual workers both display higher rates of anti-Semitism than their counterparts in France and England.

4. Occupational Mobility (Industrial)

The index of occupational mobility was constructed by determining whether the respondent's occupation ranked higher, the same, or lower than his father's on a scale ranging from professional at the top to unskilled laborer at the bottom. The English results demonstrate a significant relationship between upward mobility and low anti-Semitism; the French data indicate the same trend, although the results are not significant; the German data demonstrate no tendency one way or the other. (Table 65)

The percentages of each group in the high and low anti-Semitism categories are seen in Table 66.

If we focus on the percentages for each country who fall in the high anti-Semitic scores of 4 or 5 (meaning they reject Jews in three or four of four possible contexts), we discover that in all three countries the upwardly mobile respondents, i.e., those whose jobs are at a higher level than their fathers', have a significantly smaller percentage of their members among the high anti-Semites than the stable respondents, i.e., those whose jobs are at the same levels as their fathers'. The same trend, though somewhat weaker, is seen in the differences between the upwardly and downwardly mobile respondents in England and Germany, while in France these two categories have virtually the same percentages in the high anti-Semitic scores.

The inverse association of upward mobility and anti-Semitism is also shown in the distribution of percentages in the low anti-Semitic scores 1 and 2 (meaning that the respondents either do not reject Jews at all or reject them in only one context out of four). In all three countries, the upwardly mobile respondents differ noticeably in their percentages in these low anti-Semitic scores from both the occupationally stable and downwardly mobile respondents, the latter two sets of scores being virtually the same in all three countries. It is also of interest, and consonant with previous findings, that the German population is systematically more anti-Semitic than the French or English population, when viewed as composed of classes of mobility-experience.

5. Income

To calculate relationships of other variables with income, we used four income groups for each country whose limits were approximately equivalent by ordinary conversions, i.e., 4 DM = 5 NF = $1.00 = 7 shillings. So ordered, and aligned with scores on anti-Semitism, we discover that the English data exhibit a significant inverse relationship between income and anti-Semitism, a trend also detected in the French data, although the results are not significant at the 95 percent level. The German results display little or no such association, but this is possibly due in part to the lower percentage of German respondents in the highest income category. Tables 67 and 68 reveal details of these associations.

Within each country there is a noticeable and continuous spread in the percentages who fall into the lowest or the highest anti-Semitism categories as we go from those in the lowest to those in the highest income brackets.

6. Father's Occupation (Non-farm occupations only)

This variable was divided into five categories: 1. academic, professional, or big businessman; 2. white collar or small businessman; 3. foreman or skilled worker; 4. semi-skilled or unskilled worker; 5. unemployed or other. The English data exhibit a significant inverse association of occupational level and anti-Semitism, with anti-Semitism increasing as one moves from category 1 to category 5. However, the French data offer only very slight confirmation of this trend, while the German data exhibit no trend at all. (Table 69).

The same inverse relationship in England and absense of relationship in France and Germany is seen in the table on Occupational Levels and Anti-Semitism (Table 70).

7. Educational Mobility

Educational mobility was computed for each respondent by determing whether his achieved level of education was the same, higher, or lower than his father's. Both the gamma scores and the percentages reveal little if any connection between this variable and anti-Semitism scores. (Tables71,71a)

In summary, it can be said that certain indicators of stratified position show significant relationships with scores on anti-Semitism, notably, father's school level and the two measures of occupational level, while lesser but impressive relationships were revealed between anti-Semitic scores and income and occupational mobility.

In general, the higher the position on the ladder of stratification, however measured, the lower the anti-Semitic scores. This finding corresponds with the findings on the bearing of stratification on prejudice in other countries such as the United States. A major supposition that is widely shared is that the greater success of the respondents who sit higher on the ladders of stratification give them less reason to be suspicious and resentful of out-groups. It is also widely believed among sociologists that the greater educational achievements of high-standing respondents involves their exposure to the kinds of information and attitudes that lead to more friendly feelings to people who are different. We shall turn directly to the bearing of education, in various of its aspects, upon attitudes toward Jews.

CHAPTER IV

EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT AND ORIENTATION AND ANTI-SEMITISM

EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT AND ORIENTATIONS AND ANTI-SEMITISM

It is now quite clear that in modern industrial societies advanced education is both important for high occupational and economic status and is well recognized as such by the populations concerned. Hence, we would suppose that those who have more and hope to get more education than others, or hope to get an advanced education, and who feel that such education makes a difference, should also feel more adequately integrated into their societies and more confident about their futures. By extension, those who feel this way, we suppose, should feel less hostile to outsiders -- all other possibly relevant factors being equal. In turn, this should reflect itself on such indices of outgroup hostility as the scale measure of anti-Semitism.

On these suppositions, respondents were asked a number of questions about their orientations to their present, past, and future educational careers, and the bearings of these on their occupational careers. Also included were some estimates of the respondent's confidence in the schools and the extent to which the person appeared committed to education and its importance, as measured by how much sacrifice he thought it was proper to make to insure that one's children would get an education.

Since some of these questions could be asked relevantly only of the student population, and since this student population was perforce rather small, we sometimes had to deal with very small numbers, especially when we divided up that student population into various response categories. All the findings based on the student population, therefore, will have to be taken with greater caution than has been heretofore necessary.

1. School Level Completed

We look first at the actual levels of educational achievement of the three populations. Table 72 presents these in terms of the percents of each population whose "years of school completed" falls within a certain range; Table 73 presents distributions in terms of levels of schooling terminated, where these levels are put in the traditional categories of primary, secondary, etc. These two sets of categories do not coincide. Thus, Table 73 shows that the majority of respondents have not finished intermediary school, while from Table 72 it is clear that the majority of respondents have completed somewhere between 9 to 12 years of school. In considering school level as a variable with possible connections to ethnocentric attitudes, we shall be using the data from Table 73, since it is these classifications, i.e. primary, secondary, etc., which seem more salient in the determination of career patterns and of associated attitudes.

The bulk of the respondents in each country, as we noted, have completed only primary school. But, as we see from Table 74 the gamma scores that result are significant in France and England and verge on significance for Germany. In each case they indicate decreasing anti-Semitism with increasing education.

The gamma scores in Table 74 are based on school level as presented in Table 73. Comparable scores have been calculated for educational achievement by "years of school completed," as presented in Table 72, and while these are somewhat less substantial, they generally indicate the same inverse relationships as were shown in Table 74. We may say, then, that in general, and with the reservations noted, the higher the education, the lower the anti-Semitism.

Without attempting to explore what it is about formal educational achievement that yields the relationship with ethnocentrism, we may call attention to the fact that this finding is quite consonant with the majority of findings on the bearing of formal education on intergroup attitudes. In a large number of such studies, while the bearing of education on attitudes is not uniformly direct and forceful, there is no mistaking the generality of the inverse relationship of education and ethnocentrism.

2. Is Schooling Adequate for Jobs Desired?

It will be helpful at this point to examine certain other aspects of educational orientation to see how they bear upon ethnocentrism. We turn first to the results from the question put to all student respondents as to whether they thought their present schooling was preparing them adequately for the jobs they anticipated holding.

All answers were coded into (1) Yes, (2) Half and half, (3) No. The responses by country are shown in Table 75.

In Table 77 we show the gamma scores indicating the relationship between beliefs in adequacy of schooling and anti-Semitism. It is clear that in all three countries the relationship is inconsequential. The limits include 0 in every instance. These summary measures reduce any significance one might think to find in the distributions shown in Table 76, where, for instance, in all three countries considerably larger percentages of those who believe schooling is adequate fall in anti-Semitism category 1 than in anti-Semitism category 5. For we also note lesser degrees of the same types of differences among those who believe schooling is inadequate. That is to say, it does not appear to matter very much, so far as one's anti-Semitism score is concerned, whether one believes that his schooling is preparing him adequately for his desired job or whether one does not believe this.

3. How Much School is Needed for Success?

Could it be that those whose school aspirations are high, as measured by their perceptions of how much school they believe is needed to succeed in life would be less anti-Semitic than those who think not very much school is required? We reason that a perception of the importance of schooling for life's goals, as revealed by answers to these questions, may be a factor that works in the same way as actual level of school achieved.

In Tables 78, 79, and 80 we present the percentages who affirm various levels of school as necessary; then, certain percentage relationships between these affirmations and levels of anti-Semitism; then, finally the gamma scores measuring this relationship.

It is clear from Table 78 that the French far surpass the English and Germans in the percentages who feel that secondary education or more is necessary for success in life -- 41 percent of the French vs 13 percent of the English and Germans feeling this way.

But it is also clear from Tables 79 and 80 that how much schooling one believes to be necessary for success doesn't help distinguish low from high anti-Semites, or at least not as significantly as one might have expected. The French data incline toward significance in Table 79 and this is verified by the gamma values , Table 80, where we see that only in the case of the French do the 95 percent confidence limits on the gamma values include zero and thus yield a significant relationship.

We may conclude then that we do not get very much predictability regarding anti-Semitic scores from our knowledge of how people respond to the question of the amount of school they believe necessary to succeed.

4. How Much Schooling is Expected?

If school level actually achieved among those who have completed their school career yields significant relationships of an inverse sort with anti-Semitic scores, will the amount of school expected by those presently in school yield the same kinds of relationships? To discover the answer to this question, we asked all students how much school they expect, codifying their answers into the school level categories. In Table 81 we show the distributions for the three countries for each category of response; in

Table 82 we spread certain exemplary percentages showing relationships among school level expected and anti-Semitism scores; and in Table 83 we portray the gamma values that measure these relationships.

It is clear from the gamma scores and the relationships expressed in percentages that we would not be safe in attempting to predict an individual's anti-Semitism score from our knowledge of how much schooling he expected to achieve. In all three countries the gamma range includes zero, thus making the gamma scores insignificant. And, as we see from the percentage table, there are very sharp differences between high and low anti-Semites both in the percentages who expect only primary education and those who expect university education. In short, one cannot find anti-Semitism predominantly or exclusively among the different school-expectation groups.

5. *Will Schooling Expected Be Enough?*

If school level expected is not by itself a good predicter, can we perhaps learn something about sources of anti-Semitism by examining the differences between those who believe they will get as much or more school than they believe they need for success and those who believe they will get less than they need? Our supposition here is that those who expect to get less than they believe they need should be more bitter about things in general and more ready to be hostile to outsiders. In Tables 84,85and 36 we present marginals, percentage relationships, and gamma values for this variable and its relationship to anti-Semitism scores.

The same negative results confront us here as on the previous variables. The differences between low and high anti-Semites are not significantly greater among those who expect more school than they think is needed to succeed than among those who expect less school than they think is necessary. Though, through inadvertence, the data for the French are not available on this question, there is little reason to assume they would have scored significantly differently than the other two countries on these items. We learn, therefore, that one cannot successfully predict probable levels of anti-Semitism from a knowledge of whether the individual expects to get more or less school than he thinks necessary to succeed.

6. Schooling Expected Compared to Others

On the notion that one's sense of relative advantage over others may contribute to a general sense of well being and self assurance, and may indirectly lead to greater ease of feeling about outsiders, we asked every student respondent to state whether he thought that the education he expected to receive would be more than the average that most other people were likely to get, about the same as that, or less.

In Tables 87, 88 and 89 we spread the distribution of responses to this question, the cross classification of some of these responses against scores on anti-Semitism, and the gamma scores measuring the predictability of anti-Semitism from a knowledge of responses to this item. Very little confidence of any sort can be placed in the outcomes of this question since the distributions of responses are so skewed that there are virtually no respondents in the English and German populations who say they expect less education than others. Any percentages are therefore likely to be misleading. Thus, we find that in England, while 57 percent of those expecting more education than others are in the minimal category of anti-Semitism, 100 percent of those expecting less than others are in that category. But this 100 percent equals only two respondents. No case can be made on the basis of such data.

The gamma tables give us a basis for a bit more confidence, but again one has to be very cautious in interpreting these results because of the low number of respondents. In any event, the gamma table shows that only in the German population is there a significant relationship between the two variables, such that the anti-Semitism is low among those who expect more education than others and relatively high among those who expect less.

7. Are the Schools Reliable?

Perhaps, we reasoned, those who had confidence in the schools as reliable sources of instruction and information about events of the world would, by that token, also have the kind of general social confidence which is often found associated with relatively peaceful relations with members of groups other than their own. To probe this, we asked each respondent -- student and non-student -- to state his opinion about the reliability of schools, and in Tables 90,91 and 92 we see the three sets of results we have reported for the preceding educational variables.

The results, shown in the three tables, are interesting but not at all decisive with regard to the bearing of this variable on anti-Semitism. Table 90 shows that all three populations have a fair amount of confidence in the reliability of the schools. But Tables 91 and 92 show that this sense of the school's reliability does not separate out high from low anti-Semites. The differences between the low and high anti-Semites seem just as great among those who believe the schools are not reliable as among those who have confidence in the schools. As the table of gamma scores reveals, the 95 percent confidence limits for all three counties includes zero. We must therefore conclude that knowledge of how a respondent answers the question about the schools' reliability is not predictive of how he is likely to score on anti-Semitism.

8. Should Parents Sacrifice for their Children's Education?

As a final possible measure of orientation toward education, we sought to discover how respondents felt about how much sacrifice, if any, parents should be prepared to make on behalf of securing an education for their children.

In Table 93 we see that there are interesting country differences on this matter, the French being much more favorably inclined than the British and Germans toward the idea of parental sacrifice. We have no significant data other places in the study which would help make this difference more understandable.

In Table 94 we see, however, that there are relatively insignificant differences on anti-Semitism between the two educational orientations. While those who believe parents should sacrifice a great deal have significantly higher percentages in the categories of low anti-Semitism, so do those who believe parents should not sacrifice at all. The gamma values in Table 95 reveal that the mean values for all three countries are low and the confidence limits include zero. The same conclusion must therefore be drawn, namely, that a knowledge of how a person feels about parents sacrificing themselves on behalf of children's education is not predictive of how he will score on anti-Semitism.

Summary

Our data show that the single best predicter of anti-Semitism scores is the absolute school level achieved by the respondent. None of the other measures of orientation to education comes close to "level achieved" in its relationship to scores on anti-Semitism. While the gamma scores for the German population include zero within the confidence limits, the scores for the British and the French do not, and the gamma for all three countries taken together is also significant.

Only two other gamma scores in the array of variables examined here are significant: 1) for the German population on the amount of schooling expected as compared with others, and 2) for the French population on the amount of school thought to be needed for success. It is noteworthy that the German population does not significantly differ from the other two countries in its estimate of how much school it expects to receive as compared with others -- all three countries are fairly similar on this score. It is equally noteworthy that the French population is significantly different from the other two in the percentages who feel that secondary or university education is needed for success. The French have 41 percent of their respondents in these two categories as against 13 percent for the British and Germans. In view of the fact that the significant gamma score occurs once when the countries are not very different and once when they are, there is little that is sensible that one can say about the bearing of inter-country differences on the outcomes as measured here.

We are left to reiterate, then, that the absolute level of achievement is, for as yet unknown reasons, the best predicter of ethnocentric attitudes. We can also reiterate that this finding tallies with much of the research on this particular variable. We might suppose that those who expect to get university or advanced education would also show significantly lower anti-Semitic tendencies than those who expect to get less education. But our data bear this out only slightly in the English case and hardly at all in the French and German case. Nor do the data bear out the expectations one might have with regard to the possible importance of believing that more rather than less education is needed to succeed.

Yet, one must report actual achievement does matter. Once past certain cut-off points in the educational ladder, and particularly, apparently, once past the university level, there seem to be definite changes in attitudes from those held by persons with lesser achievements.

We would at this point tend to view the question of "What is it about advanced education that makes the difference" as both one of the most moot and most important questions needing research. The fact that certain measures of stratified position -- income and occupational prestige, for example -- also show this correspondence with differences in ethnocentrism, urge upon one the notion that the fact of being well placed in the society appears to have a most determinate effect on one's ability to tolerate the differences implied or exemplified by members of other groups, and to sustain reasonably friendly or un-hostile relationships with them, and not to demand or desire considerable social distance from them. Being well placed may imply the following: 1) a stake in the society; 2) a sense of accomplishment with a concommitant sense of confidence in self; 3) a relative freedom from fear regarding others; 4) the ability to determine one's ends and means in life with some greater autonomy than is available to others; 5) a sense of being respected and hence not having to denigrate others in order to assure oneself of his worth. All these are possible dimensions of the social psychology of status that might bear upon ethnocentrism.

It is, of course, eminently possible as well, that while educational level indexes social position, it also indexes a certain degree of exposure to curricular and other materials that could shape one's attitudes toward other groups. Previous research has suggested some such relevance for curricular content and for kinds of exposures to kinds of enlightened opinion leaders and formers. We do not know whether these factors are operative in the populations here studied. But we do have data to investigate certain other characteristics of the educated vs the uneducated population that may help throw some light on the outcomes. We shall, in future analysis, examine whether the educated and uneducated populations differ in their exposures to mass media; in the number of Jews they have come to know and with whom they have had pleasant experiences; in the kinds of beliefs they have about Jews; in the patterns of child rearing to which they have been exposed; in their degrees of trust, optimism and belief in self-reliance; in their senses for their achievement in life, and their estimates of their future likelihoods. We shall compare the well and the less well-educated on these matters, holding variables constant in turn, so that we can determine, for instance, whether the better educated are less anti-Semitic and are also significantly more optimistic about their future. By this technique we hope to discover what other factors are characteristic of the better and less educated populations that may help account for why they differ significantly in their degree of rejection of Jews, and, by implication, in their general hostility to outsider groups.

TABLES 1 TO 95

EDUCATION, SOCIAL CLASS AND INTERGROUP ATTITUDES IN ENGLAND, FRANCE AND GERMANY

TABLE 1

Percent in Each of Three Countries Who Reject Social Relationships With Jews in 0 to 6 Different Contexts

Country	Number of Contexts						
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
England N = 566	43	25	12	5	4	4	6
France N = 539	42	28	12	5	5	4	4
German N - 434	36	24	16	8	5	4	7

TABLE 2

Percent in Each of Three Countries who Reject Social Relationships with Americans in 0 to 6 Contexts

	Number of Contexts						
Country	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
England N = 575	68	11	9	5	3	2	1
France N = 547	68	20	7	2	1	1	1
Germany N = 465	62	20	8	2	3	4	1

TABLE 3

Percent of (1) English and French who Reject Germans, and (2) Percent of Germans who Reject Poles, in 0 to 6 Different Contexts

	Number of Contexts						
Country	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
England N = 564	44	16	10	6	6	5	12
France N = 545	51	21	8	5	4	4	6
Germany N - 432	24	14	12	11	11	11	17

TABLE 4

Percent of English who Reject West Indian Colored
Percent of French who Reject Algerians
Percent of Germans who Reject Russians
in 0 to 6 Different Contexts

	Number of Contexts						
Country	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
England N = 554	20	26	17	11	8	6	12
France N-534	23	19	11	10	8	9	21
Germany N = 528	23	13	13	10	12	10	20

TABLE 4 a

Percent who Reject Various Groups in 4 to 6 Contexts

Groups extremely rejected (4 to 6 contexts)	Country		
	England	France	Germany
Americans	6	3	8
Jews	14	13	16
Germans (by French and English) Poles (by Germans)	23	14	39
Colored (by English) Algerians (by French) Russians (by Germans)	26	38	42

TABLE 5

Percent in Each of Three Countries who Reject Jews in Various Contexts

Reject Jews as:	Country England	France	Germany
Neighbors	12.7	10.7	13.5
School Fellows	13.5	10.2	12.2
Fellow Workers	14.6	13.7	13.7
Friends	17.1	15.7	28.7
Employers	31.3	28.6	34.5
Sons-in-law	49.4	50.8	60.0

Table 5a

Percent in Each Country who Reject Americans in Various Contexts

	Country		
Reject Americans as:	England	France	Germany
Neighbors	10.6	4.6	4.2
School fellows	6.8	4.4	5.7
Fellow workers	10.7	5.1	5.2
Friends	9.2	6.9	11.5
Employers	20.4	11.3	18.8
Sons-in-law	21.5	26.2	32.3

Table 5b

Percent of English and French who Reject Germans in Various Contexts; Percent of Germans who Reject Poles in Various Contexts

Reject Germans as: (for English and French) Reject Poles as: (for Germans)	Country		
	England	France	Germany
Neighbors	26.8	19.9	39.3
School fellows	20.7	12.2	26.3
Fellow workers	22.6	11.5	26.7
Friends	25.7	17.9	48.1
Employers	40.4	24.1	56.3
Sons-in-law	46.6	43.4	70.3

Table 5c

Percent of English who Reject Colored in Various Contexts
Percent of French who Reject Algerians in Various Contexts
Percent of Germans who Reject Russians in Various Contexts

	Country		
Rejections by English of Colored as_____ Rejections by French of Algerians as____ Rejections by Germans of Russians as_____	England	France	Germany
Neighbors	33.6	44.5	44.4
School fellows	21.7	36.0	27.0
Fellow workers	21.5	29.8	27.5
Friends	30.3	41.1	50.6
Employers	44.0	47.9	59.1
Sons-in-law	78.4	71.8	70.4

TABLE 6

Number and Percent of Respondents in Each of Five Different Categories of Anti-Semitism

Anti-Semitism Categories	Countries: Three Countries N	%	England N	%	France N	%	Germany N	%
1 Does not reject Jews at all	669	34	259	37	240	34	170	29
2 Rejects Jews only as sons-in-law	354	18	127	18	132	19	95	16
3 Rejects Jews as sons-in-law and employers	263	13	101	15	106	15	56	10
4 Rejects Jews as sons-in-law, employers, friends	143	7	35	5	38	5	70	12
5 Rejects Jews as sons-in-law, employers, friends and in 2 or 3 of following: fellow workers, fellow students, neighbors	157	8	57	8	50	7	50	9
6 No response	395	20	117	17	142	20	136	24

TABLE 7

Percent of Respondents in Each of Five Categories of Anti-Semitism

	Countries			
	Three Countries	England	France	Germany
Anti-Semitism Categories	N = 1586	N = 579	N = 566	N = 441
1 Does not reject Jews at all	42	45	42	39
2 Rejects Jews only as sons-in-law	22	22	23	21
3 Rejects Jews as sons-in-law and employers	17	17	19	13
4 Rejects Jews as sons-in-law, employers, friends	9	6	7	16
5 Rejects Jews as sons-in-law, employers, friends, and in 2 or 3 of following: fellow workers, fellow students, neighbors	10	10	9	11

TABLE 8

Percent Citing Various Good and Bad Features of the Nazi Regime

Country	Number and Kind of Features Cited			
	1 or more good, no bad	Both good and bad	1 or more bad, no good	No good, no bad
England N = 663	Less than 1%	3	56	12
France N = 674	Less than 1%	3	47	19
Germany N - 561	2	72	21	6

TABLE 9

Percent in Various Anti-Semitic Categories who Cite Various Features of the Nazi Regime

	Country		
	England	France	Germany
Percent who cite both good and bad who fall in anti-Semitism category 1	47	42	37
Percent who cite both good and bad who fall in anti-Semitism category 5	7	6	11
Percent who cite only bad who fall in anti-Semitism category 1	42	42	48
Percent who cite only bad who fall in anti-Semitism category 5	12	10	10

TABLE 10

Gamma Values of Relationship between Scores on Anti-Semitism Index and Attitudes toward Nazi Regime

Countries	Gamma Values Low	Mean	High
Three Countries Combined	-0.112	-0.0321	0.0475
English	-0.0383	0.0990	0.236
French	-0.123	0.0162	0.155
German	-0.341	-0.166	0.00809

TABLE 11

Percentages Expressing Positive, Neutral and Negative Feelings toward Jews

	Country		
	English	**French**	**German**
Feelings Expressed:			
Positive	26	18	11
Neutral	62	67	80
Negative	12	15	09

TABLE 12

Gamma Values of Relationship between Anti-Semitism Index Scores and Personal Feelings toward Jews

Country	Gamma Values		
	Low	Mean	High
Three Countries Combined	.399	.473	.546
English	.261	.383	.505
French	.433	.551	.669
German	.380	.530	.680

TABLE 13

Percent of Those in Various Categories of Personal Feelings toward Jews who Fall in Various Categories of Anti-Semitism

	Country					
	England		France		Germany	
	Anti-Sem category 1	Anti-Sem category 5	Anti-Sem category 1	Anti-Sem category 5	Anti-Sem category 1	Anti-Sem category 5
Of all those who express:	(low reject.)	(high reject)				
1 Positive feelings toward Jews	56	.008	61	1	51	0
2 Neutral feelings toward Jews	47	5	47	3	42	6
3 Negative feelings toward Jews	18	4	14	49	11	57

TABLE 14

Percent Reporting Pleasant Experiences with Jews in Three Countries

	Country			
	Three Countries N = 1981	England N - 696	France N - 708	Germany N = 57
Number of pleasant experiences				
1 None	68	65	64	78
2 Few	26	28	29	19
3 Some	6	7	6	3
4 Many	less than 1%	less than 1%	less than 1%	less than 1%

TABLE 15

Gamma Values of Relationship between Anti-Semitism Index Scores and Types of Experiences had with Jews

Country	Gamma Values		
	Low	Mean	High
Three Countries Combined	-0.362	-0.293	-0.223
English	-0.478	-0.369	-0.259
French	-0.273	-0.155	-0.0375
German	-0.502	-0.351	-0.201

TABLE 16

Percent in Various Stereotyping Categories who Fall in Various Categories of Anti-Semitism

	Country					
	England		France		Germany	
Percent who affirm	Anti-Sem Category 1 (low reject)	Anti-Sem Category 5 (high reject)	Anti-Sem Category 1 (low reject)	Anti-Sem Category 5 (high reject)	Anti-Sem Category 1 (low reject)	Anti-Sem Category 5 (high reject)
Percent who affirm 1 to 3 stereotypes	88	39	59	26	78	50
Percent who affirm 7 to 10 stereotypes	less than 1%	13	20	16	2	17

TABLE 17

Gamma Values of Relationships between Scores on Anti-Semitism Index and Number of Unfavorable Traits Ascribed to Jews

	Gamma Values		
Country	Low	Mean	High
Three Countries Combined	.193	.270	.346
England	.320	.435	.550
France	.00218	.136	.271
Germany	.104	.260	.416

TABLE 18

Percent of Various Age Groups in Different Anti-Semitism Categories, by Country

(Figures rounded out)

	Country											
	England Age Groups			France Age Groups			Germany Age Groups			Combined Age Groups		
Anti-Semitism Category	14-18 N=172	19-35 N-179	36-50 N-228	14-18 N-196	19-35 N-181	36-50 N-189	14-18 N=113	19-35 N-134	36-50 N-194	14-18 N-481	19-35 N-494	36-50 N-611
1. low rejection	48	47	50	48	41	37	41	46	32	47	45	37
2.	17	23	25	20	21	29	21	17	25	19	21	26
3.	18	17	17	20	20	16	14	12	12	18	17	15
4.	7	4	7	4	7	10	14	11	20	7	7	12
5. high rejection	10	9	11	8	10	8	10	14	10	9	11	10

No Response excluded

TABLE 19

Percent of Different Age Groups in Each Country who Fall in Various Anti-Semitism Categories

Anti Semitism Category	Country								
	England			France			Germany		
	Age Groups			Age Groups			Age Groups		
	14-18	19-35	36-50	14-18	19-35	36-50	14-18	19-35	36-50
Reject Jews in none or 1 category	65	70	65	68	62	66	61	63	57
Reject Jews in 3 or 4 categories	16	12	18	12	18	18	24	25	20

TABLE 20

Gamma Values for Relationship of Age and Anti-Semitism Index Scores

Country	Gamma Values Low	 Mean	 High
Three Countries Combined	.026	.086	.147
England	-.040	.064	.169
France	-.006	.094	.195
Germany	-.021	.089	.200

TABLE 21

Gamma Values of Relationship between Anti-Semitism and Anti-Americanism

	Gamma Values		
Country	Low	Mean	High
Three Countries Combined	.626	.667	.709
English	.554	.631	.707
French	.558	.633	.709
German	.686	.749	.812

TABLE 22

Relationship between Anti-Semitism and Anti-Americanism Among French and Germans

Ethnocentric Sentiments	Country France	 Germany
Percent rejecting Jews in 0 or 1 context	67	51
Percent rejecting Americans in 0 or 1 context	88	81
Percent who accept Jews in all contexts who accept Americans in all contexts	91	95
Percent who accept Americans in all contexts who reject Jews in 0 or 1 context	78	80
Percent who reject Americans in 4, 5, or 6 contexts who reject Jews in 2, 3, or 4 contexts	16/17	34/36
Percent who reject Jews in 4 contexts who reject Americans in 0 or 1 context	68	33

TABLE 23

Gamma Values for Relationships among Various Ethnocentric Sentiments

	Gamma Values		
Country	Low	Mean	High
England	.465	.547	.628
France	.562	.638	.714
Germany	.449	.529	.608

TABLE 24

Relationships Among Various Ethnocentric Sentiments

Ethnocentric Sentiments	Country		
	English	French	German
Percent of those accepting Germans or Poles in all contexts who accept Americans in all contexts	90	91	100
Percent of those rejecting Germans or Poles in all contexts who accept Americans in all contexts	54	53	42

TABLE 25

Relationships Among Various Ethnocentric Sentiments

	Country		
	Rejection by English of Germans	Rejection by French of Germans	Rejection by Germans of Poles
Percent rejecting group in 0 to 1 context	71	74	36
Percent rejecting group in 4 to 6 contexts	22	14	39

TABLE 26

Relationships Among Various Ethnocentric Sentiments

	Country		
	Rejection by English of Colored	Rejection by French of Algerians	Rejection by Germans of Russians
Percent rejecting group in 0 to 1 context	46	43	37
Percent rejecting group in 4 to 6 contexts	26	37	40

TABLE 27

Relationships Between Anti-Americanism and Other Ethnocentric Sentiments

	Country		
	Rejection by English of Colored	Rejection by French of Algerians	Rejection by Germans of Russians
Percent of those accepting group in all contexts who accept Americans in all contexts	94	93	99
Percent of those rejecting group in all contexts who accept Americans in all contexts	57	64	44

TABLE 28

Gamma Values for Relationships Among Various Ethnocentric Sentiments

	Gamma Values		
Country	Low	Mean	High
England	.366	.454	.541
France	.213	.311	.408
Germany	.425	.507	.589

TABLE 29

Gamma Values for Relationships between Anti-Semitism and Other Ethnocentric Sentiments in England

Ethnocentric Sentiments	Gamma Values Low	 Mean	 High
anti-German	.536	.606	.676
anti-Colored	.411	.488	.566

TABLE 30

Relationships between Anti-Semitism and Other Ethnocentric Sentiments

	Group Rejected:		
	Jews	Germans	Colored
Percent of rejection in 0 to 1 context	68	60	46
Percent of rejection in more than 3 contexts	10	24	26

TABLE 31

Rejections of Jews, Germans and Algerians by French Respondents

	Group Rejected:		
	Jews	Germans	Algerians
Percent of rejections in 0 to 1 context	66	73	43
Percent of rejections in more than 3 contexts	9	14	37

TABLE 32

Gamma Values for Relationship between Scores on Anti-Semitism Index and Feelings toward Germans and Algerians in France

Ethnocentric Sentiments	Gamma Values		
	Low	Mean	High
Anti-German	0.456	0.537	0.617
Anti-Algerian	0.513	0.581	0.649

TABLE 33

Relationships Between Anti-Semitism and Other Ethnocentric Sentiments in Germany

	Group Rejected:		
	Jews	Poles	Russians
Percent of rejections in 0 to 1 context	59	39	36
Percent of rejections in more than 3 contexts	12	38	41

TABLE 34

Gamma Values for Relationship between Anti-Semitic Attitudes Toward Poles and Russians in Germany

Ethnocentric Sentiments	Gamma Values		
	Low	Mean	High
anti-Polish	0.517	0.593	0.669
anti-Russian	0.457	0.535	0.614

TABLE 35

Rejections of Various Groups by English, French and Germans

	The English reject:				The French reject:				The Germans reject:			
	Amer.	Jews	Germans	Colored	Amer.	Jews	Germans	Alger.	Amer.	Jews	Poles	Russ.
Percent who reject group in more than one context	21	32	40	54	22	34	27	67	29	41	61	64

TABLE 36

Number and Percent in Each of Four Different Categories of Ethnocentrism, for Three Countries, Singly, and Combined

	Country							
	Combined		England		France		Germany	
Ethnocentrism Category	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
(1) Minimum (0 to 4 rejections)	665	48	260	51	246	51	159	42
(2) (5 to 9 rejections)	363	26	144	28	142	30	77	20
(3) (10 to 14 rejections)	254	19	74	14	68	14	112	29
(4) Maximum (15 to 18 rejections)	294	7	34	7	26	5	34	9
TOTAL	1376	100	512	100	482	100	382	100

TABLE 37

Gamma Values for Relationship between Anti-Semitism and General Ethnocentrism in England, France, and Germany

Country	Gamma Values		
	Low	Mean	High
Three Countries Combined	.613	.656	.699
English	.557	.634	.711
French	.592	.665	.739
German	.574	.652	.730

TABLE 38

Relationship between Scores on Anti-Semitism and Ethnocentrism

	Country		
	English	French	Germany
Percent in anti-Semitism score (AS) 1 (minimum) who are in Ethnocentrism score (ES) 1 (minimum)	78	78	72
Percent in AS 1 who are in ES 5 (maximum)	4	0	0
Percent in ES 1 who are in AS 1	64	61	65
Percent in ES 1 who are in AS 5 (maximum)	2	0	2
Percent in AS 5 who are in ES 1	10	0	6
Percent in AS 5 who are in ES 3 or 4	75	58	79
Percent in ES 4 who are in AS 1	6	0	0
Percent in ES 4 who are in AS 5	72	89	92

TABLE 39

Ethnocentrism by Age, for England, France, and Germany Combined

Age Groups	Percent in Various Ethnocentric Categories Category 1 (low)	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4 (high)
14 to 18 N = 450	58	29	11	2
19 to 35 N = 457	52	29	15	4
36 plus N = 580	47	29	19	4

TABLE 40

Ethnocentrism by Age, in England

Age Groups	Percent in Various Ethnocentric Categories Category 1 (low)	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4 (high)
14 to 18 N = 167	60	27	10	2
19 to 35 N = 164	61	25	12	2
36 plus N = 204	49	28	17	6

TABLE 41

Ethnocentrism by Age, in France

Age Groups	Percent in Various Ethnocentric Categories			
	Category 1 (low)	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4 (high)
14 to 18 N = 179	60	32	8	0
19 to 35 N = 160	53	34	11	2
36 plus N = 164	55	28	13	4

TABLE 42

Ethnocentrism by Age, in Germany

	Percent in Various Ethnocentric Categories			
Age Groups	Category 1 (low)	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4 (high)
14 to 18 N = 104	50	26	17	7
19 to 35 N = 133	41	26	23	10
36 plus N = 182	37	31	28	3

TABLE 43

Gamma Values for Relationship between Age and Ethnocentrism in England, France, and Germany

	Gamma Values		
Country	Low	Mean	High
Three Countries Combined	0.0800	0.150	0.220
England	0.0515	0.172	0.292
France	-0.0252	0.101	0.227
Germany	-0.0271	0.0968	0.221

Table 44
Beliefs about Jews

Characteristics	The English say that, relative to others, Jews are: (N = 374)						The French say that, relative to others, Jews are: (N = 254)						The Germans say that, relative to others, Jews are: - (N = 297)					
	More		Less		Same		More		Less		Same		More		Less		Same	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Intelligent	197	52.7	14	3.7	163	43.6	115	45.3	6	2.4	133	52.3	127	42.3	9.	3.0	161	54.7
Good citizens	122	32.6	32	8.5	220	58.9	44	17.7	55	21.6	155	60.7	60	20.2	28	9.4	209	71.4
Honest businessmen	81	21.7	103	27.5	190	40.8	28	15	116	45.7	100	39.3	20	6.7	121	40.7	156	52.6
Good neighbors	87	23.3	47	12.6	240	64.5	16	6.3	25	9.8	213	83.9	71	23.9	8	2.7	218	73.4
Good parents	222	59.3	14	3.7	138	37	63	24.8	6	2.4	185	72.8	46	15.5	17	5.7	234	78.8
Courageous	103	27.5	43	11.5	228	61	96	37.8	52	20.5	106	41.7	39	13.1	59	19.9	199	67
Clannish	275	73.5	17	4.5	82	22	185	72.8	13	5.1	56	22.1	154	51.8	5	1.7	138	46.5
Greedy	107	28.6	30	8.0	237	63.4	133	52.4	22	8.7	99	38.9	79	26.6	29	9.8	189	63.6
Moral	139	37.2	24	6.4	211	56.4	37	14.6	51	20.1	166	65.3	29	9.8	24	8.1	244	82.1
Democratic	98	26.2	54	14.5	222	59.3	65	25.6	36	14.2	153	60.2	46	15.5	27	9.1	224	75.4

TABLE 45

Percent in Each of Three Countries who Ascribe One to Ten Undesirable Traits to Jews

	Number of Traits									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Country										
England N = 304 *	42	23	13	11	7	1	1	1	1	0
France N = 254	24	13	19	15	8	6	1	1	0	13
Germany N = 185	23	25	23	15	8	3	3	0	1	0

* Note: The low totals for each country are due to the fact that we counted as "No response" anyone who failed to answer any of the ten questions. Since on the interview forms it was unfortunately impossible to sort out those who said no unfavorable things about Jews from those who did not answer, the former are also included in the "No response" group.

TABLE 46

Relationship between Anti-Semitism and Ascriptions of Unfavorable Traits to Jews

	Country		
	England	France	Germany
Ascribing 1 unfavorable trait to Jews:			
Percent in AS 1	56	30	40
Percent in AS 5	4	11	0
Ascribing 2 to 3 unfavorable traits to Jews:			
Percent in AS 1	32	29	38
Percent in AS 5	34	16	50
Ascribing 6 or more unfavorable traits to Jews:			
Percent in AS 1	1	25	2
Percent in AS 5	17	43	25

Table 47

Gamma Values for Relationship between Anti-Semitism and Ascription of Unfavorable Traits to Jews in England, France, and Germany

Country	Gamma Values Low	 Mean	 High
Three Countries Combined	.20	.27	.35
England	.32	.44	.55
France	.002	.14	.27
Germany	.10	.26	.42

TABLE 48

Number and Percent in Each Country who Say Various Traits are Due to Heredity

	Country					
	England		France		Germany	
Traits	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Tall vs short	633	93.2	659	96.9	555	97.0
Brave vs cowardly	371	54.9	389	58.3	377	66.2
Clever vs stupid	483	70.7	547	82.9	392	83.6
Honest vs dishonest	308	45.2	233	34.2	313	54.7
Dark skin vs light	668	97.1	664	97.2	562	98.2
Loyal vs disloyal	287	42.3	167	26.9	169	29.6
Industrious vs lazy	333	48.9	35	51.8	312	54.5
Strict vs lenient with children	359	52.8	281	45.0	265	46.7
Aggressive vs shy	437	64.2	452	67.8	453	78.9
Cares about money vs does not care about money	313	45.7	289	44.1	275	48.2

TABLE 49

Percent in Each Country Who Believe in Hereditary Character of Various Numbers of Traits

	Number of Traits									
Country	Any 1*	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	All 10
England N= 667	less than 1%	5	10	13	14	18	10	9	7	14
France N= 485	0	4	6	14	16	16	19	12	7	6
Germany N= 547	less than %	2	6	10	13	17	16	12	11	13

* We are, unfortunately, unable to report the number and percent of those who did not believe that any of the ten traits were due to heredity since, in the processing of the interviews, these were unfortunately included with those who gave no response.

TABLE 50

Percent in Each Country Who Believe in Hereditary Character of Traits

Country	Hereditary Origins Ascribed to: 1 to 3 traits %	4 to 7 traits %	8 to 10 traits %
England N= 667	15	55	30
France N= 485	10	65	25
Germany N= 547	8	56	36

TABLE 51

Percent Believing in Hereditary Character of Traits who are in Various Anti-Semitism Categories

	Country		
	England (N= 559)	France (N= 419)	Germany (N= 426)
Believing in Hereditary Character of 1 to 3 Traits			
Percent in A S 1	17	15	10
Percent in A S 5	9	3	2
Believing in Hereditary Character of 4 to 7 Traits			
Percent in A S 1	50	66	55
Percent in A S 5	53	66	39
Believing in Hereditary Character of 8 to 10 Traits			
Percent in A S 1	33	19	35
Percent in A S 5	38	31	59

TABLE 52

Gamma Values for Relationship Between Hereditarian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism

	Gamma Values		
Country	Low	Mean	High
Three Countries combined	.0321	.0837	.135
England	-.101	-.0176	.065
France	.0819	.176	.269
Germany	.0387	.130	.221

TABLE 53

Percent in Each Country Who Gave "Racist" Responses to Each of Ten Items

Items (See list on pages 41 and 42)	Country		
	England	France	Germany
1	84.6	79.9	83.2
2	73.3	70.8	62.5
3	26.7	22.3	19.9
4	17.7	18.4	26.6
5	39.4	12.7	12.9
6	72.4	68.9	67.9
7	71.8	67.9	59.7
8	46.5	68.0	48.0
9	46.3	20.9	20.4
10	60.9	35.0	45.1

TABLE 54

Number and Percent in Each Country Who Give 1 to 10 "Racist" Responses*

Country		Number of Racist Responses Any 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	All 10	Total
3 countries combined	No.	44	78	137	186	224	264	226	95	18	11	1283
	%	3	6	11	15	17	21	18	7	1	less than 1%	
England	No.	6	22	46	55	81	96	106	49	11	0	472
	%	1	5	10	12	17	20	22	10	2	0	
France	No.	21	25	39	68	81	80	39	20	1	0	374
	%	6	7	10	18	22	21	10	5	less than 1%	0	
Germany	No.	17	31	52	63	62	88	81	26	6	11	437
	%	4	7	12	14	14	20	19	6	1	3	

* Unfortunately, we are unable to present the number who gave no racist responses since, in the processing of the data, this category was joined with those who did not respond.

TABLE 55

Percent in Each of Three Countries Who Affirm Different Numbers of "Racist" Statements and Different Numbers of "Hereditarian" Statements

Country	Racist Responses			Hereditarian Responses		
	Affirm 1 to 3 racist statements	Affirm 4 to 7 racist statements	Affirm 8 to 10 racist statements	Affirm 1 to 3 hereditarian statements	Affirm 4 to 7 hereditarian statements	Affirm 8 to 10 hereditarian statements
England	15	72	13	15	55	30
France	23	71	6	10	65	25
Germany	22	67	11	8	56	36

TABLE 56

Country	Gamma Values for Relationship Between Hereditarian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism			Gamma Values for Relationship Between Racist Beliefs and Anti - Semitism		
	Low	Mean	High	Low	Mean	High
Three countries combined	.0321	.0837	.135	.131	.190	.250
England	-.101	-.0176	.065	.0554	.155	.255
France	.0819	.176	.269	.152	.257	.361
Germany	.0387	.130	.221	.102	.206	.311

TABLE 57

	Gamma Values for Relationship Between Hereditarian Thinking and Ethnocentrism			Gamma Values for Relationship Between Racist Thinking and Ethnocentrism		
Country	Low	Mean	High	Low	Mean	High
Three countries combined	.0706	.1328	.193	.1345	.203	.273
English	-.0597	.0417	.143	.0942	.206	.319
French	.0716	.188	.304	.164	.293	.423
Germany	.1538	.157	.260	.0423	.163	.283

TABLE 58

	Gamma Values for Relationship Between Hereditarian Thinking and Unfavorable Stereotyping of Jews			Gamma Values for Relationship Between Racist Thinking and Unfavorable Sterotyping of Jews		
Country	Low	Mean	High	Low	Mean	High
Three countries combined	.0327	.101	.170	.0697	.145	.219
England	.0406	.0737	.188	.00019	.130	.259
France	.0235	.139	.255	.114	.240	.365
Germany	.0250	.109	.242	.129	.277	.426

TABLE 59

	Gamma Values for Relationship Between Educational Level and Hereditarian Thinking			Gamma Values for Relationship Between Educational Level and Racist Thinking		
Country	Low	Mean	High	Low	Mean	High
Three countries combined	0.0321	0.0837	0.135	0.131	0.190	0.250
England	-0.101	-0.0176	0.065	0.0554	0.155	0.255
France	0.0819	0.176	0.269	0.152	0.257	0.361
Germany	0.0387	0.130	0.221	0.102	0.206	0.311

TABLE 60

Gamma Values for Relationship between Father's School Level and Anti-Semitism

Country	Gamma Values Low	 Mean	 High
Three countries combined	-0.273	-0.183	-0.0943
England	-0.517	-0.350	-0.184
France	-0.240	-0.105	0.0294
Germany	-0.312	-0.138	0.0364

TABLE 61

Gamma Values for Relationship between Occupation and Anti-Semitism

Country	Gamma Values Low	 Mean	 High
Three countries combined	0.0586	0.118	0.177
England	0.0564	0.153	0.250
France	0.0204	0.127	0.233
Germany	-0.0466	0.0621	0.171

TABLE 62

Percent of Respondents in Various Occupations Who are in Various Anti-Semitism Categories

	Country														
	England					France					Germany				
	Occupations*					Occupations					Occupations				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Percent in anti-Semitism category 1-2	94	72	66	50	73	81	64	69	61	63	71	52	59	63	56
Percent in Anti-Semitism category 4-5	3	11	16	27	16	6	18	13	21	20	23	22	32	26	29
Percent of group in population of country	7	26	12	29	25	14	30	8	20	28	5	30	21	19	24

*Occupations:
1-- academic, professional, or big business
2-- small businessman or white collar
3-- foreman or skilled worker
4-- semi-skilled or unskilled
5-- unemployed or housewife

TABLE 63

Gamma Values for Relationship between Manual vs Non-manual Work and Anti-Semitism

	Gamma Values		
Country	Low	Mean	High
Three countries combined	-0.363	-0.274	-0.184
England	-0.433	-0.285	-0.138
France	-0.491	-0.327	-0.162
Germany	-0.395	-0.238	-0.0807

TABLE 64

Percent of Respondents in Manual vs Non-Manual Occupations Who are in Various Anti-Semitism Categories

	Country					
	England		France		Germany	
	Manual	Non-Manual	Manual	Non-Manual	Manual	Non-Manual
Percent in anti-Semitism categories 1 and 2	58	72	60	81	55	71
Percent in anti-Semitism categories 4 and 5	21	13	20	6	32	20
Percent of group in population of country	55	45	75	25	67	33

TABLE 65

Gamma Values for Relationship between Occupational Mobility and Anti-Semitism

Country	Gamma Values Low	 Mean	 High
Three countries combined	0.00129	0.0991	0.185
England	0.0308	0.165	0.300
France	-0.0450	0.113	0.272
Germany	-0.155	0.00266	0.161

TABLE 66

Percentage of Respondents in Various Mobility Categories Who are in Various Anti-Semitism Categories

	Mobility Categories								
	England			France			Germany		
	Up	Same	Down	Up	Same	Down	Up	Same	Down
Percent in anti-Semitism categories 1 and 2	80	59	60	74	63	63	68	58	60
Percent in anti-Semitism categories 4 and 5	9	21	15	11	21	13	22	31	32
Percent of group in population of country	32	45	23	28	47	25	26	45	29

TABLE 67

Gamma Values for Relationship between Income and Anti-Semitism

Country	Gamma Values Low	Mean	High
Three countries combined	-0.166	-0.0972	-0.0282
England	-0.310	-0.197	-0.0841
France	-0.216	-0.0955	-0.0245
Germany	-0.134	-0.00430	0.125

TABLE 68

Income Levels and Anti-Semitism

	Income Levels (1 = low, 4 = high)											
	England				France				Germany			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Percent in Anti-Semitism categories 1 and 2	56	61	73	79	49	66	72	72	58	59	60	83
Percent in Anti-Semitism categories 4 and 5	19	18	15	0	20	16	9	10	36	25	29	0
Percent of group in each country	9	49	39	4	19	48	26	7	8	54	37	1

TABLE 69

Gamma Values for Relationship between Father's Occupation and Anti-Semitism

Country	Gamma Values Low	 Mean	 High
Three countries combined	0.0496	0.108	0.167
England	0.167	0.263	0.359
France	-0.0162	0.0886	0.193
Germany	-0.172	-0.0599	0.0520

TABLE 70

Occupational Levels and Anti-Semitism

	Country														
	England					France					Germany				
	Occupational Levels*					Occupational Levels					Occupational Levels				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Percent in anti-Semitism categories 1 and 2	79	75	64	63	33	70	64	67	63	1	61	54	60	71	1
Percent in anti-Semitism categories 4 and 5	4	8	17	20	44	8	18	19	19	0	19	33	26	23	0
Percent of group in population of country	15	23	27	34	2	30	32	8	29	1	12	31	34	21	1

* Occupations:

1 - academic, professional, or big business
2 - small businessman or white collar
3 - foreman or skilled worker
4 - semi-skilled or unskilled
5 - unemployed or housewife

TABLE 71

Gamma Values for Relationship between Educational Mobility and Anti-Semitism

Country	Gamma Values		
	Low	Mean	High
Three countries combined	-0.109	-0.0308	0.0479
England	-0.158	-0.0220	0.114
France	-0.147	-0.254	0.0963
Germany	-0.207	-0.0421	0.122

TABLE 71a

	England			France			Germany		
	Mobility			Mobility			Mobility		
	Up	Same	Down	Up	Same	Down	Up	Same	Down
Percent in anti-Semitism categories 1 and 2	78	64	71	63	65	71	53	60	60
Percent in anti-Semitism categories 4 and 5	7	19	8	10	19	8	28	28	25
Percent of group in population of country	8	70	21	14	69	16	9	78	14

TABLE 72

Percentage of Respondents in Each of Three Countries Who have Gone to School for Specified Numbers of years

	Years of School Completed				
Country	0	1 to 4	5 to 8	9 to 12	13 plus
England N= 671	less than 1%	less than 1%	7	80	13
France N= 698	less than 1%	1	35	42	21
Germany N= 567	0	less than 1%	68	26	5

TOTAL 73

Percentage of Respondents in Each of Three Countries Who have Finished Certain Levels of Schooling

Country	None	Primary	Intermediary	Secondary	University
	Level of School Completed				
England N= 661	0	71	21	2	6
France N= 700	2	71	19	4	5
Germany N= 573	0	76	20	30	14

TABLE 74

Gamma Values for Relationship Between School Level and Anti-Semitism

	Gamma Values		
Country	Low	Mean	High
Three countries combined	-0.272	-0.196	-0.120
England	-0.419	-0.291	-0.162
France	-0.260	-0.136	-0.0125
Germany	-0.291	-0.139	0.0126

TABLE 75

Is Schooling Adequate for Job?

Country	% Yes	% Half and Half	% No
England N= 124	68	14	19
France N= 151	71	14	15
Germany N= 66	76	8	17

TABLE 76

Adequacy of Schooling and Anti-Semitism

	Country		
	England	France	Germany
Percent who believe schooling is adequate who fall in A S 1	54	53	43
Percent who believe schooling is adequate who fall in A S 5	2	7	5
Percent who believe schooling is inadequate who fall in A S 1	39	25	40
Percent who believe schooling is inadequate who fall in A S 5	6	15	10

TABLE 77

Gamma Values for Relationship Between Adequacy of Schooling and Anti-Semitism

Country	Low	Mean	High
England	-.26	.06	.39
France	-.05	.20	.45
Germany	-.51	-.06	.38

TABLE 78

How Much School is Necessary to Succeed?

Country	Percent who Say: None	Primary	Intermediate	Secondary	University
England N= 596	0	35	52	2	11
France N= 682	less than 1%	24	35	26	15
Germany N= 572	0	42	45	11	2

TABLE 79

Amount of School Needed and Anti-Semitism

	Country		
	England	France	Germany
Percent who believe only primary school is needed, who fall in A S 1	40	42	43
Percent who believe only primary school is needed who fall in A S 5	11	15	8
Percent who believe university is needed who fall in A S 1	39	56	25
Percent who believe university is needed who fall in A S 5	7	3	13

TABLE 80

Gamma Values for Relationship between Amount of School Needed and Anti-Semitism

	Gamma Values		
Country	Low	Mean	High
England	-.15	-.04	.08
France	-.23	-.13	-.03
Germany	-.03	.09	.22

TABLE 81

How Much School Do You Realistically Expect to Achieve?

	Percent Who Say:				
Country	None	Primary	Intermediate	Secondary	University
England N= 107	0	43	31	0	26
France N= 154	0	18	19	22	41
Germany N= 59	0	25	27	22	25

TABLE 82

School Level Expected and Anti-Semitism

	Country		
	England	France	Germany
Percent who expect only primary school who fall in A S 1	50	37	44
Percent who expect only primary school who fall in A S 5	0	16	0
Percent who expect university who fall in A S 1	62	54	62
Percent who expect university who fall in A S 5	0	3	8

TABLE 83

Gamma Values for Relationship between School Level and Anti-Semitism

	Gamma Values		
Country	Low	Mean	High
England	-.43	-.15	.13
France	-.32	-.11	.10
Germany	-.49	-.16	.17

TABLE 84

Schooling Expected vs Schooling Believed Needed

	Percent who say that, relative to amount needed, they expect to get:		
Country	More	As Much	Less
England N= 120	33	39	27
France	NO DATA		
Germany N=	47	36	17

TABLE 85

Education Expected vs Education Needed and Anti-Semitism

	Country		
	England	France	Germany
Percent who expect more than needed who fall in A S 1	57	NO DATA	50
Percent who expect more than needed who fall in A S 5	3	NO DATA	12
Percent who expect less than needed who fall in A S 1	50	NO DATA	14
Percent who expect less than needed who fall in A S 5	5	NO DATA	0

TABLE 86

Gamma Values for Relationship between Expected-Needed Types and Anti-Semitism

	Gamma Values		
Country	Low	Mean	High
England	-.12	.17	.46
France	NO DATA		
Germany	-.16	.19	.54

TABLE 87

Schooling Expected Compared to Others

Country	Percent who say they expect More	Same	Less
England N= 131	53	44	3
France N= 151	24	63	13
Germany N= 65	30	65	5

TABLE 88

Comparative Schooling Expected and Anti-Semitism

	Country		
	England	France	Germany
Percent who expect more than others who fall in A S 1	57 (N= 47)	58 (N= 31)	28 (N= 18)
Percent who expect more than others who are in A S 5	2	6	11
Percent who expect less than others who are in A S 1	100 (N= 2)	38 (N=13)	100 (N= 1)
Percent who expect Less than others who are in A S 5	0	15	0

TABLE 89

Gamma Values for Relationship between Comparative School Expected and Anti-Semitism

	Gamma Values		
Country	Low	Mean	High
England	-.21	.12	.46
France	-.16	.12	.40
Germany	-.75	-.39	-.03

TABLE 90

Are the Schools Reliable?

Country	Percent who say: Yes	Partly	No
England N= 632	61	28	10
France N=599	48	35	17
Germany N= 496	59	30	10

TABLE 91

Belief in Reliability of Schools and Anti-Semitism

	Country		
	England	France	Germany
Percent who believe schools are reliable who fall in A S 1	44	43	41
Percent who believe schools are reliable who fall in A S 5	11	8	13
Percent who believe schools are unreliable who fall in A S 1	52	43	35
Percent who believe schools are unreliable who fall in A S 5	5	12	5

TABLE 92

Gamma Values for Relationship between Belief in Reliability of Schools and Anti-Semitism

	Gamma Values		
Country	**Low**	**Mean**	**High**
England	-.18	-.05	.07
France	-.09	.03	.15
Germany	-.12	.01	.14

TABLE 93

Should Parents Sacrifice for Children's Education?

Country	Percent Who Say: A great deal	Some	None
England N= 647	7	42	51
France N= 681	41	52	7
Germany N= 468	14	29	57

TABLE 94

Attitudes toward Parents' Sacrifice and Anti-Semitism

	Country		
	England	France	Germany
Percent who believe parents should sacrifice a great deal who fall in anti-Sem. cat. 1	51	43	40
Percent who believe parents should sacrifice a great deal who fall in anti-Sem. category 5	20	5	15
Percent who believe parents should not sacrifice at all who fall in anti-Sem. category 1	45	44	43
Percent who believe parents should not sacrifice at all who fall in anti-Semitism category 5	7	17	11

TABLE 95

Gamma Values of Relationship between Attitudes toward Parents' Sacrifice for Education of Children and Anti-Semitism

	Gamma Values		
Country	Low	Mean	High
England	-.14	-.02	.10
France	-.02	.10	.21
Germany	-.19	-.05	.08